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extensively on each topic. This thesis exposed me to the infallibility of mankind. It taught me 
that, when it comes to leadership, history teaches lessons for contemporary leaders. 
Paradoxically, writing a thesis on failure only left me hopeful as I believe the past holds answers 
about the present. Finally, while I spent a year analyzing the effects of competing demands on 
individuals’ ability to effectively plan, I cannot help but wonder – what do I miss in my everyday 
life while trying to juggle a million tasks?  
Through it all, I am convinced the secret to success lies in effective teamwork. Which 
leads me to my final acknowledgement – the Cadets and Cadre of the MIT Army Reserve 
Officers’ Training Corps Paul Revere Battalion and all the soldiers with whom I came in contact 
over the last four years. The Army operates under a philosophy which professes the necessity of 
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exposure to incredible men and women who not only espouse in words but also uphold in 
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1 Unofficial acknowledgement of Margaret Dalton (‘17) for pointing out that the subtext of my thesis is actually 
100+ pages discussing men who seemed to not deliberately plan, inaccurately understood a situation, and refused to 
collaborate. Thus, an alternate title for the thesis is: “A Case Study on Why Women Should Run Empires: Great 
Britain’s Shifting North American Military Strategy, 1768-1775.” 
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“No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond first contact with the main hostile 
force…”2 
 
The large schooner sailed into Boston Harbor in late September of 1768 after completing its 
long, perilous journey across the Atlantic Ocean. Anxiety, excitement, and a sense of duty 
lingered in the air as the lines were cast ashore and the ship docked. The Loyalist soldiers on 
board moved into formation. Standing in their ranks, they prepared to disembark. Each man 
knew his mission directed by the Crown – “support and protect the Civil Magistrates, and the 
Officers of His Majesty’s Revenue.” Military force was not to be used; rather, the Crown 
dispatched his Regulars solely to aid civil authorities in their administration of the “Preservation 
of the publick Peace, and the due Execution of the Laws.” 3 The arrival of troops in Boston 
brought Great Britain’s North American military campaign into the heart of the King’s America. 
Recovering from fighting the Seven Years’ War, wanting to protect the British officials in the 
colonies, and seeking to stabilize its North American holdings, Great Britain resolved to repair 
the devolving relationship with its colonial subjects. Little did the Regulars know that, not seven 
years later in 1775, they would engage in prolonged armed conflict with the rebellious colonists. 
For months before the landing, Massachusetts Bay Governor Francis Bernard, 
Commander in Chief Thomas Gage, and Secretary of State the Earl of Hillsborough, debated 
heavily whether His Majesty’s forces would deploy to New England. Secretary Hillsborough 
made the administrative case to Governor Bernard arguing that, to those in London, “it is but too 
                                               
2 Quotation often attributed to Helmut von Moltke the Elder in his essay “On Strategy.” There is discrepancy over 
the accuracy of this attribution. The quotation is oft paraphrased. This is one paraphrase. 
3 “Lords Journals,” 24 November 1767-25 September 1770, Vol. 32, 8 GEO. III-10 GEO III, HL/PO/JO/2/32. 
General Thomas Gage confirmed his understanding of this stability mission in a letter to Secretary Hillsborough 
dated just days before the troops arrived in Boston Harbor. The letter dates 26 September 1768 and relays General 
Gage’s promise to conduct “measures to defeat any Treasonable designs, and to support the Constitutional Rights of 
the King and Kingdom of Great Britain” and that, meanwhile, he would “confine myself solely to the granting such 
Aids to the Civil Power” (CO 5/86). Note that for all quotations, I have preserved the writer’s original spelling, 
capitalizing, and punctuation rather than correcting it. 
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evident, not only from the Accounts contained in your last letters, but also from a Revision of the 
State of your Government for some Time past, that the Authority of Civil Power is too weak to 
enforce Obedience to the Laws, and preserve that Peace and good Order which is essential to the 
Happiness of every state…” Bernard, likely gripping the letter from his superior, must have 
known what order would come next. Hillsborough’s words continued, “His Majesty has thought 
fit, upon the most mature Consideration of what has been represented by yourself and by the 
Commissioners of Customs, established at Boston, to direct the Commander in Chief of His 
Majesty’s Forces in America, to station one Regiment at least in the Town of Boston, and to 
garrison, and if necessary to repair, the Fort or Castle of William and Mary.”4 Bernard believed 
that introducing a military presence in the colony would further stoke the protests, 
demonstrations, and violent flare-ups which engulfed Boston and the surrounding area since 
1765.5  
Yet, three months after denouncing need for military support, Governor Bernard, with a 
changed heart, wrote to General Gage and the English authorities in September of 1768: “There 
has been so many publick and private Declerations of [colonial] intention, to resist the Forces of 
Great Britain...that I think so time should be lost to provide against them. There have also been 
Riots at Salem and Newbury against the Custom House Officers, of so violent a nature, that it 
will require a Military Force to bring the Rioters there to Reason…” After describing the 
unprecedented violence in his colony, the Governor, seemingly in need of assistance, requested 
“considerable Reinforcements to the Troops here.”6  
                                               
4 Hillsborough to Bernard, 11 June 1768, CO 5/765. 
5 Bernard to Gage, 16 September 1768, CO 5/86. Bernard’s description of activity in Boston in 1768: “As the Sons 
of Liberty kept to continually declaring that no King’s Troops should enter Boston, I was apprehensive that the 
sudden Appearance of Troops would produce temporary mischiefs, before the Troops could get ashore to prevent 
them…I am informed, at a general meeting it was agreed to rise in opposition; and at a private meeting, it was 
agreed to attack and take the castle…” 
6 Ibid. 
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With Governor Bernard’s observations in mind, King George III and his ministry 
unanimously agreed to send His Majesty’s Regular forces, under the command of General 
Thomas Gage, to stabilize Boston in 1768. Yet, the unity of mind experienced in 1768 did not 
last long. To the leaders’ surprise, the North American colonists continued to reject imperial 
authority rather than succumb to the show of force as the British political and military Decision 
Makers predicted.7 Uncertain of how to proceed and distracted by other geopolitical and 
economic threats to the British Empire, the King, Prime Minister, Secretary of State, and 
Commander in Chief all began to develop their own personal opinions of how to handle the 
unraveling situation in North America. Britain’s top ministers would fail to agree on a common 
strategy in America until 1774; but by then it was too late to compel the American colonists from 
resisting British rule. The absence of a coherent plan from London allowed the North American 
English subjects to rise in defiance of the Crown. Imperial overreach, in addition to other 
complexities associated with overseeing a global empire, made assembling a cohesive strategy in 
America even more difficult. Lack of unity over strategy ultimately catalyzed the devolution of 
what began as a stability operation to maintain peace and support civil authorities to an offensive 
military operation. 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
Countless books, journals, movies, and shows exist about the American Revolutionary 
War. Most of these individually address the personalities of British politicians or generals 
involved in the War, the disposition of the British Army, British foreign policy in the eighteenth 
century, or the various components of the economy. Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy provides a 
comprehensive account of British leadership in his book The Men Who Lost America. Pieces on 
                                               
7 “Decision Makers” refers collectively to the five men I identify in Chapter I. This identifier is capitalized because 
of its specific usage in my thesis.  
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the military failures of Thomas Gage and the personality of King George III intimately describe 
their characters. In televised and performed media, HBO’s “John Adams,” AMC’s “Turn: 
Washington’s Spies,” and Lin Manuel Miranda’s “Hamilton” all offer insight on people 
associated with the American Revolution. Authors also provide surveys of the development of 
both the British and American militaries. Reginald Hargreaves documents the Regulars in his 
The Bloodybacks: The British Serviceman in North America and the Caribbean 1655-1783 while 
Michael Pearson writes of the colonial militias in Those Damned Rebels: The American 
Revolution as Seen through British Eyes.  
Scholars continue their focused niche, often offering comprehensive surveys, when it 
comes to foreign policy and economics. Pertinent works include Jeremy Black’s Parliament and 
Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century and P.J. Marshall’s The Making and Unmaking of 
Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1765-1783. Some works such as Kathleen DuVal’s 
Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution and Claudio Saunt’s West of 
the Revolution: And Uncommon History of 1776 provide perspective on other emerging conflicts 
in North America. Economic historians such as Charles Andrews, T.H. Breen, and Ralph Davis 
discuss British economic policy and the mother country’s economic relationship with the 
colonies. They make the case for economic causes of war. Yet, the geopolitical and economic 
arguments alone are insufficient. None of this literature explicitly analyzes the effects of foreign 
policy and economics on the people in power – let alone those in Great Britain.  
While these are compelling on their own, only an aggregate view of the people, military, 
geopolitics, and economics provide a complete depiction of how and why the American 
Revolution began in 1775. Few aside from John Shy assess how the interconnectedness of these 
elements affected Great Britain’s North American military strategy, and why said strategy of 
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stability ultimately failed. Yet, even Shy’s Towards Lexington: The Role of the British Army in 
the Coming of the American Revolution does not provide a comprehensive conceptual overview 
of the geopolitical and economic environments facing the Decision Makers. His works, though 
comprehensive, focus more on the disposition and capabilities of the British military itself, rather 
than linking the greater factors and tensions at play.    
Moreover, works on the prelude to the War (1768-1775) are slim in and of themselves. 
Literature carefully assesses the immediate aftermath of the French and Indian War as well, the 
proximate period before the Revolutionary War, or offers surveys of the eighteenth century, but 
few works discuss the events of the British Empire in the interwar years. When considering these 
works, it is also important to note that most scholarship on the American Revolution, particularly 
in popular culture, is just that – scholarship written by Americans on the American perspective of 
the Revolutionary War during the years of conflict.  
As such, I seek to contribute to the expansive list of literatures about the American 
Revolution by looking at British strategy and decision making in the prelude to the War from 
1768 to 1775. I do this by complementing primary source analysis of correspondences found at 
the National Archives with the assessments made in the aforementioned literature. I first describe 
the key players in the prelude to the American Revolutionary War and their personalities. 
Chapter I: The Decision Makers is the who of who was in power and the why of why they made 
decisions the way that they did. I identified 5 people primarily responsible for the war in North 
America: George III, Lord North, Earl of Hillsborough, Earl of Dartmouth, and General Gage. 
Chapter II: The Neighbors and Chapter III: The Market zoom out from focusing on the 
personalities and instead put the personalities in context of how the competing demands on the 
Decision Makers and their responses to geopolitical and economic events threatening the British 
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Empire from 1768-1775. In these chapters, I use many of the letters of correspondences between 
people and departments and refer to the personalities and constitutional roles of these individuals 
to explain why the decision makers then acted the way that they did. More generally, this thesis 
uses the actions of the Decision Makers as a case study through which to develop an 
understanding of the human dimension of warfare. Remembering that real people who faced 
personal and logistical puzzles is paramount when considering the coming of the American 
Revolution.  
Rarely does scholarship explore decision making across the British Empire that occurred 
in Whitehall and London. Previous studies suggest that violence between the motherland and her 
American subjects erupted solely because of the rebellious colonists. They position New 
England as the epicenter of British focus in the late eighteenth century. Yet, it is imperative to 
remember that colonial rebellion fell into a long list of competing demands on the leaders of the 
British Empire. There is no denying that activity throughout the thirteen North American 
colonies, especially that in Boston, ultimately pushed the King to declare his subjects in a state of 
rebellion in October 1775 and declare war by April.8  
Global superpowers do not simply lose wars – especially to a militia with inferior 
armaments, training, and manpower. The Americans may have won the Revolutionary War, but 
theirs is not the only story worth telling. This, then, is the story of the coming of the American 
Revolutionary War, or the War for American Independence, from the British perspective. This 
thesis ultimately answers why Britain failed to retain its North American colonies by offering an 
analysis of British pre-war planning, the problems facing Great Britain from 1768 to 1775, and 
the global tensions pulling on the Decision Makers. 
                                               
8 King George III, 27 October 1775, Joint Address to Parliament. 
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The predominating colony-focused narrative oversimplifies the role of the British 
political and military Decision Makers in the coming of the War for Independence. It overlooks 
the human dimension of war by not considering personalities, motives, and distractions; thereby 
failing to remember that the enemy has a say in conflict. Correspondences between the King and 
the Prime Minister, orders from the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and the Commander in 
Chief of the British Forces in North America, as well as parliamentary addresses from the Crown 
all demonstrate that Great Britain was not passively reacting to North American activity. Instead, 
leaders actively made role-specific decisions about not just North America but also the entire 
British Empire. Their responses to various events disclose information about where and why 
each Decision Maker focused his energy. When viewed in aggregate, correspondences also allow 
for individual opinions regarding the Massachusetts Bay to be tracked over the seven years 
leading up to the American War of Independence. In the short run, influences meant that 
priorities and opinions shifted as the administration faced new global and domestic challenges. In 
the long run, and most detrimental to the Crown, the complexities of running an empire 
prohibited establishing a cohesive, lasting strategy for North America. 
Much of the complexity branding the situation in Boston and the surrounding colonies 
was due to personal beliefs and motivations of the Decision Makers, rather than deliberate 
planning, shaping strategy. Historian Ira Gruber expounds on the genesis of strategy in the late 
18th century. He offers that, “British leaders developed their strategies in the War for American 
Independence primarily to suit their understanding of the rebellion, their attitudes toward it, and 
the special circumstances of the war itself.”9 This made any North American military strategy 
                                               
9 Ira Gruber, “The Origins of British Strategy in the War for American Independence,” Military History of the 
American Revolution, edited by Major Stanley J. Underdal, 38-52 (Colorado: United States Air Force Academy, 
1976), 49. 
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susceptible to failure due to the dominating personalities. Though all Decision Makers expressed 
unity in the initial decision to send His Majesty’s Forces to Boston in 1768 and again unified in 
1774 in deciding to attempt to coerce the colonists into submission, disunity over strategy 
characterized all other years.  
Letters from the Colonial and War Offices housed in The National Archives in Kew, 
England, as well as records in the Parliamentary Archives in London, England demonstrate the 
difficulty of ruling a truly global empire in the eighteenth century. On the surface, 
correspondences convey the decorum observed from governing in a hierarchical structure. “Sir” 
or “My Lord” often begin letters while “Yours, “Your Lordship,” or “Most Obedient” conclude 
the note. Between the lines, however, emerges the multiple competing demands on the military 
and political Decision Makers. Pertaining to our region of interest, while pages are filled with 
mentions of the Massachusetts Bay from 1768 to 1775, what is telling is that, proportional to the 
amount of correspondences and addresses available from this period, mentions of the New 
England colonies are sparse. Rather, attention is given to domestic happenings, promotions and 
demotions, European activity, and debates about the North America frontier.  
As my analysis of a combination of primary and secondary sources will demonstrate, 
Boston occupied little of the collective attention of English leaders. In its place emerged a 
complicated narrative emblematic of the human element of governance and planning. Leaders 
balanced their enumerated and implicit responsibilities, detailed and conceptual planning, and 
the political fragility and vulnerability which came with many of their positions. While it is easy 
to write off the American War of Independence as an epic loss for the “mighty” British Empire, 
when assessing the human dimension of conflict, the unfocused and non-cohesive approach to 
handling North America is more understandable. An examination of the personalities and roles 
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of five British leaders, of the global threats to the British Empire, and of the characteristics of the 
English economic system combines primary and secondary sources and highlights the competing 
demands which often overshadowed North America in English dialogues before mid-1774.  
Geopolitical and economic threats contributed to influencing the personalities to 
individually champion competing and constantly shifting strategies of appeasement, conciliation, 
military suppression, economic sanctions, or swift and forceful action between 1768 and 1774, 
then again in 1775 immediately preceding the march on Concord. Ultimately, French and 
Spanish security threats to the British mainland and her colonies coupled with nearly eight years 
of crippled trade and lost colonial revenue catalyzed the coming of the War for Independence. 
These events hindered the ability of those in power from 1768 to 1775, the English political and 
military Decision Makers, to create a unified strategy for North America. This failure to establish 
an overarching North American strategy led the British military strategy in these colonies to 
deteriorate from one of stability and support to a strategy of forceful suppression, resulting in the 
War whose end witnessed a tremendous loss for the British Empire.  
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Chapter I: The Decision Makers 
A Young Monarch, Dutiful Prime Minister, Two Diametric Secretaries, and a Reluctant General 
 
Even in a monarchy, the responsibility of the outbreak of the American War of Independence did 
not reside with one man. A cacophony of bureaucrats, politicians, and military officials – at all 
levels of Parliamentary hierarchy – catalyzed the violence across the ocean in 1775. The 
monarch reigned supreme in this system but did not rule without his advisors. Under him fell the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet comprised of the various Secretaries, in one branch. 
Secretaryship included titles such as: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary at 
War, and Lord of the Admiralty. The colonial governors reported to the Cabinet. Parliament, 
comprised of the House of Lords and the House of Commons, made the other branch.  
 
Though a hierarchical structure, in chaotic times, roles often blended – a flaw which only 
increased chaos. Moreover, it was not simply the decision-making systems of the eighteenth 
Figure 1. A simplified depiction of the Great Britain’s governmental 
structure 1768-1770. Note the hierarchical structure. The positions most 
pertinent to this analysis are included in this figure.  
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century which enabled war; rather, it was the unique personalities and perspectives of the men 
who held the positions within the structure that hindered strategic cohesion and enabled war 
between mother country and colony.  
These personalities regularly clashed when making decisions, especially decisions over 
the North American colonies, creating confusion within the British Empire. As British historian 
Peter James Marshall explains, “Uncertainty reflected the quandary of political leaders in both 
government and opposition in Britain who wanted to avoid conflict with the colonies while 
affirming the supreme authority of Parliament to govern America.”10 Here Marshall identifies the 
penultimate conflict within and among the administration in this analysis. The differing opinions 
on how to enforce the supremacy of Parliament, which differed not only from person to person 
but also changed by person as events shook the British Empire, dictated many of the ministerial 
debates from 1768 to 1775.     
Thus, personalities mattered in the prelude to the American War of Independence. 
Debates over courses of action became internal, ideological struggles, not just political 
discussions. The King primarily received recommendations from the Prime Minister, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Commander in Chief of the British Forces in North 
America. Each of these people held their own beliefs about the British Empire and her 
relationship with her subjects. Additionally, they all came from different backgrounds and 
therefore approached their positions with their own biases, propensity for risk, and processes for 
acquiring information and making decisions. How and why Great Britain declared war on her 
own colonies can only be understood once the personalities of five key men holding various 
positions in the British political and military administrations from 1768-1775 are understood.  
                                               
10 P.J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America c. 1750-1783 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 318 
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The King: King George III, a Conflicted Hawk 
King George III, the reigning monarch of Great Britain, sat behind his large wooden desk in his 
office at his palace in Whitehall. Gazing out his window at St. James’ Park and the city of 
London, he reviewed his October address to Parliament. Between paragraphs, King George 
paused. The weight of the words of the address must have weighed heavily on the King’s mind. 
How did events come to this? He could have pondered. Just one year earlier, tensions in North 
America were seeming to subside. This pleased George as bloodshed was the King’s last resort 
based on his orders to for the Regulars to aid the civil authorities in maintaining the public peace. 
Yet, by October of 1775, everything changed.  
The shift in the King’s mindset of how to handle the North American situation meant 
that no longer would he champion his prior policies of appeasement or even coercion; rather, 
military suppression seemed to be the only effective course of action. The Monarch began 
reading again. “The object is too important,” his speech suggested about the North American 
colonies. “The spirit of the British nation too high, the resources with which God hath blessed 
her too numerous, to give up so many colonies which she has planted with great industry, nursed 
with great tenderness, encouraged with many commercial advantages, and protected and 
defended at much expence of blood and treasure...” King George III reflected on the might of the 
British Empire. Starting again he expressed, “It is now become the part of wisdom, and (in its 
effects) of clemency, to put a speedy end to these disorders by the most decisive exertions. For 
this purpose, I have increased my naval establishment, and greatly augmented my land 
forces...”11 With this speech, the Monarch informed Parliament of his decision to prepare for 
armed conflict.  
                                               
11 King George III, 27 October 1775, Joint Address to Parliament. 
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He again gazed out his office window at the peaceful, lush green gardens of St. 
James’ Park. The serenity with which the Londoners wandered through the fall-colored gardens, 
seemingly oblivious to the current tumult tearing apart their beloved empire, amazed George. He 
did not want to upset the status quo – yet, he himself no longer even knew what the status quo 
for an empire the size of England’s was. Normally the King would not jointly address the houses 
of Parliament unless convening a session. October of 1775, however, was no ordinary October. 
Colonial upheaval in North America, external threats from England’s neighbors France and 
Spain, a recovering economy, and a divided Ministry clouded George’s mind. The King called 
the House of Commons and the Lords together early in an emergency session to address the state 
of the American colonies and rally Parliament behind decisively engaging the North American 
subjects. War was no longer a discussion as it had been before – to George, it inevitably loomed. 
Like his predecessors, the Monarch boasted a vast array of interests. Well-versed in 
topics ranging from agriculture and farming to the arts and sciences, George could relate to most 
anyone. As a young man, George brought an affable, cheerful, and fresh air to the Crown. He 
was overall well-liked in personality; and tall, robust, and graceful in demeanor. King George 
III’s interests proved beneficial for social gatherings. Unfortunately, they did not equate to 
experience in leading an empire.  
The third Hanoverian to rule the kingdom of Britain, King George III needed to 
uphold the reputation of both in his namesake and the responsibility of the reigning monarch. 
Though he did not unanimously make decisions, the strength of the British Empire fell on the 
King’s shoulders. Considering the scope of the British Empire, this was a large burden for one 
man to bear. At the time, England exercised influence around the globe. Global power relied on 
the strength of colonial and territorial holdings. Therefore, when threats jeopardized part of the 
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King’s empire, it was as if the autonomy of England herself was being challenged. George 
quickly learned this lesson when, at only twenty-two years old, he assumed the throne in 1760 
during the height of the Seven Years' War. King George did not boast a strong background in 
strategic planning during this first global conflict.12 While he did partake in negotiating the War's 
end, his lack of experience dictated that he leave strategy to his cabinet and generals, taking a 
predominate role only in the logistical administration of military affairs.13 Thus, not only was the 
King conditioned to be cautious to commit his nation to conflict, given the tumult of the 1760s; 
but also, prior to the Revolutionary War, the King did not gain strategic military experience.  
Yet, George would not allow his youth and inexperience to damper his patriotism and 
dedication to serving England. In his ascension, the monarch declared that “‘he was born and 
educated in the country’ and that he gloried ‘in the name of Briton.’” George III maintained this 
love of country, a sentiment which dictated emotions and actions, throughout the entirety of the 
American War of Independence. Indeed, the way the King treated his fellow countrymen 
mirrored his admiration of his nation. The notable English essayist and biographer Samuel 
Johnson claimed George to be “the first monarch in a hundred years to identify seriously with the 
interests of his people and try to make friends with his fellow countrymen.”14 As Lord 
Hillsborough, the Secretary of State for the Colonies described to the Governor of Massachusetts 
Bay in 1768, “His Majesty is the tender and affectionate Father of all His Subjects…”15 Thus, at 
least in the beginning of the occupation of Boston, George regarded the North Americans as his 
                                               
12 As defined by Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, a strategic plan is a “plan for the overall conduct 
of a war” and includes a strategic estimate or considerations given to a “broad range of strategic factors that 
influence the commander’s understanding of its operational environment and its determination of missions, 
objectives, and courses of action.” 
13 Ira D Gruber, “The Origins of British Strategy in the War for American Independence,” Military History of the 
American Revolution, edited by Major Stanley J. Underdal (Colorado: United States Air Force Academy, 1976), 38. 
14 Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 19. 
15 Hillsborough to Bernard, 16 February 1768, CO 5/765. 
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own and advocated for their well-being. Creating a shared interest between Great Britain and the 
colonies through a fatherly ruling such as this was of utmost importance to the King.16 
Throughout the period leading to the American War of Independence, the monarch 
found himself in a precarious position as he balanced his enumerated and expected 
responsibilities as the King of England with his personal views and desires. Though he sought to 
“identify” and “make friends with” his subjects, as the monarch, King George III also had a 
responsibility to govern firmly and uphold the supremacy of Parliament. This tension may have 
accounted for George’s confliction with how to handle colonial rebellion and susceptible to the 
opinions of those with whom he surrounded himself. The English constitution charged the 
monarch with appointing government ministers, to include the Prime Minister.17 Many of 
George’s ministers served in politics longer than the King’s reign. This is significant as Kings 
“probably listened to their subministers far more than their social equals when administration 
came under discussion.”18 Thus, if those in King George’s administration – especially his Prime 
Minister and Secretaries of State – offered their perspective on a situation in the British Empire, 
George would have been likely to listen and entertain their recommendation. At least when times 
appeared peaceful. 
Ideally, the monarch was meant to be supreme, uninhibited by public pressures, yet 
still govern in conjunction with his cabinet and Parliament. In describing this partnership for 
George III, Michael Pearson writes that George “exercised personal executive control of a nation 
that possessed great expanses of territory thousands of miles away, both to east and west, but he 
did so only with the cooperation of a careful and often critical parliament.” Finally, the system 
                                               
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid, 19. 
18 Franklin B Wickwire, British Subministers and Colonial America, 1763-1783 (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1966), 3-4. 
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dictated that all orders to the colonies were supposed to come from the King through the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the colonial subjects, themselves.19 This means that the 
monarch was rarely free to think and act independently of advice from his administration and the 
Lords and gentlemen which comprised Parliament.   
Foundationally, convention, not law, established the English monarchy, which 
enabled George III to hold his own opinions and agenda.20 Excitement, expansion, and instability 
characterized events both internal and external to the British Empire during the period in which 
King George III reigned. As King, all events which could affect the power of England and, by 
extension, the power of the monarch, concerned George. Thus, the Monarch’s focus necessarily 
shifted with the world. He could not afford tunnel vision. This is evident in George III’s 
changing attitude towards his North American subjects in the prelude to the American War of 
Independence.  
Before penning his Parliamentary address in 1775, King George truly viewed war in 
America as avoidable and a last resort. From the time the first troops arrived in Boston in 1768 
until 1773, George championed a policy of support and appeasement to his subjects across the 
Atlantic. His affable character shone through as he tried to identify with the needs of his people, 
as Samuel Johnson claimed George did. Desiring to be liked and to avoid conflict, George 
offered conciliatory measures towards his North American colonies. In this period, the King’s 
attention was otherwise diverted as crises emerged throughout his empire. However, in January 
of 1774 after learning of the incident which historiographies of the War would come to call the 
Boston Tea Party, the King’s attention refocused on North America with a new vengeance. No 
                                               
19 Michael Pearson, Those Damned Rebels: The American Revolution as Seen through British Eyes (New York: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1972), 14-16. 
20 Michael Rush, Parliamentary Government in Britain (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1981), 32. 
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longer did he espouse a policy of appeasement. Instead, George III urged coercion to assert the 
supremacy of Parliament. He still wanted to delay bloodshed with his subjects. Yet, with events 
in the colonies growing progressively more violent, the King considered other options for 
maintaining the public peace and ensuring the execution of laws. Over the course of the year, 
George III’s policy morphed into one of suppression on the eve of 1775. Though it would be 
easy to blame the King of England for the outbreak of the American War of Independence, the 
story is not that simple. King George did deliver the fateful address to both houses of Parliament; 
but George did not govern in a vacuum. He was not alone in the decision-making which led to 
that monumental decision to move forward only with force.  
The Prime Minister: Lord North, a Susceptible Dove 
Lord North endured numerous long, arduous cabinet meetings in the 1770s. From concerns over 
continental neighbors, to domestic economic crises, and, finally, worries over English influence 
in North America, the opinions of the Prime Minister’s Secretaries felt relentless. Personally, 
Frederick would have sought non-violent measures to either coerce, appease, or work with the 
North American subjects as he thought this approach would most economically benefit the 
Crown. At least, he must have thought, appeasement would create one less immediate threat to 
the Empire about which to worry. Economic crisis caused by the East India Company, relations 
between Indian and British officials in British India, and Parliamentary debates over how to 
solve both these issues offered the thinly-stretched man enough material to occupy his attention.  
Politically, Lord North knew a solution to the colonial situation would prove much 
more arduous than simply a decision made by one man. It would require all his Ministers, as 
each man possessed his own area of expertise and unique focus. The necessity of a multiplicity 
of perspectives, however, inspired administrative conflict. Debate over the colonies ensued for 
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the entirety of Lord North’s tenure as Prime Minister. At first, he carried the support of the 
Crown and Parliament. However, as the years progressed and tension escalated, North witnessed 
the opinions of his peers changing while his did not.  
As Frederick North, he was liked by all. The Lord displayed “self-deprecating 
humor,” wit, a jovial demeanor, and humility. His love of literary anecdotes highlighted his 
intelligence. He also knew Europe well, on both academic and personal levels. Frederick grew 
up with George; a relationship full of irony given the diametrically opposed views of the Prime 
Minister and the King regarding the North American colonies by the end of 1774. The Earl of 
Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies under Lord North, was the Prime Minister’s 
stepbrother. Thus, North could not separate the personal from the political and felt obligated in 
his service to the Crown.21  
As Lord North, the Prime Minister was much less liked and respected by his decision-
making counterparts. Historian P.J. Marshall explains that:  
North’s views and actions were certainly not those of a Prime Minister intent on tyranny 
in America. He wanted to defuse the situation in the colonies in part to secure the 
stability of his own government in Britain. He was politically vulnerable for he did not 
have his own party following but relied upon the support of a coalition of different 
factions. Furthermore, he was temperamentally averse to confrontation. He had a habit of 
postponing difficult decisions, hesitating and changing his mind...22  
 
A very different image of North emerges from this characterization than the jovial Frederick 
described before. Here, the fragility of the office of the Prime Minister and, specifically of 
North’s power, becomes apparent. Even his contemporaries of echoed the susceptibility of 
North’s character.  
                                               
21 O’Shaughnessy, 48-49. 
22 Marshall, 318. 
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Horace Walpole, Parliament member turned historian, documented his first-person 
observations of the Prime Minister in his Memoirs on the Reign of King George the Third. 
Walpole writes of North that, “His indolence prevented his forming any plan. His indifference 
made him leap from one extreme to another; and his insensibility to reproach reconciled him to 
any contradiction...Lord North engrossed whatever fell in his war, and sometimes was bribed by 
the Crown to promote Acts, against which he pretended his conscious recoiled.”23 While telling 
of North, Walpole’s background must be considered when considering this reflection. A staunch 
Whig and ex-politician, Walpole may have held personal reasons for writing this scathing 
testimony of North’s tenure. Even still, it is a valuable account a Fredrick North from a peer 
within the British political leadership. Walpole highlights key reasons why North, specifically, 
and the Decision Makers, more generally, failed to establish a cohesive strategy for a majority of 
the years the military occupied Boston. He first deliberately blames the Prime Minister for the 
absence of a plan regarding North America. Next, Walpole distinctly points out that the Lord 
could be easily swayed – a flaw which contributed to confusion amongst the administration amid 
the myriad distractions occurring between 1768 to 1775. Much of Walpole’s comments about 
North may truly have been results of the Prime Minister’s character. Some of them, on the other 
hand, especially that about North’s acquiescence to bribes from King George III, may have been 
due to the doctrinal role of the Prime Minister in British politics.  
The Prime Minister served at mercy of the King and his political party. In overseeing 
the cabinet, he both managed others – his undersecretaries – and himself, always balancing 
maintaining the support of the reigning monarch and the majority party.24 The government 
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(Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845), 231. 
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WHEN PERSONALITIES DOMINATE, STABILITY FAILS: GREAT BRITAIN’S CHANGING NORTH AMERICAN 
MILITARY STRATEGY, 1768-1775 
 
23 
system made little distinction between administrator and politician in 18th century England. 
Rather, the bureaucracy changed as quickly as parties changed in election years.25 Yet, while the 
people who held cabinet positions may have been temporary, the Cabinet as an institution, was 
an indelible part of the English government. The Hanoverians themselves codified the 
permanence of the Cabinet during George I and George II’s reigns as King of England. It was 
under them, too, that power was placed in the hands of politicians.26 Therefore, by George III’s 
rule, the Prime Minister as it was imagined in the late-1700s was still a relatively new concept 
and susceptible to error. Due to the political nature of the Cabinet, regardless of his own 
opinions, North needed to propose acts favorable to the Crown and his political party if he 
wished to maintain relevance.  
When he first entered office, North removed the Townshend Duties except for the 
Tea Act because North believed that these acts economically hurt Britain more than punished the 
colonists. He also overrode the Currency Act of 1764, and allowed for western expansion. 
Seemingly paradoxically, North sponsored the East India Tea Act in 1773 and the Coercive Acts 
in 1774. However, he did so again only for economic reasons. Lord North claimed that 
“arrangements regarding the importation of tea into America, provided in the act of 1773, had 
been made in the interests of the merchants – that is, for the benefit of the East India 
Company.”27 This economic, nonviolent reasoning fueled many of the Prime Minister’s policies. 
He thought that imposing punishments on all North America would lead to colonists isolating the 
Bostonians and pressuring them to instead work with Parliament.28 Much to everyone’s chagrin, 
this plan failed. North stood perplexed. As he expressed just three years earlier to the House of 
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26 Ibid, 32. 
27 Dora Mae Clark, British Opinion and the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 226. 
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Commons, peace remained his end goal. In front of the House chamber, North offered that he 
would “most cheerfully would I give [my income] all – not only the part which I derive from the 
public purse, but my own private fortune – if I could only thereby accelerate an honourable, 
speedy peace.”29 The Lord seemed willing to forgo his personal comfort if it meant stability in 
the British Empire. He championed the supremacy of Parliament to accomplish peace, but 
questioned the appropriateness of escalation of force. By 1774, Lord North almost entirely 
shrunk from the prospect of war. As he disclosed to King George III that same year, he feared 
that if Great Britain did not risk something, then “all is over.”30 The Coercive Acts were his 
proposition for providing an alternate form of pressure on the rebellious colonists.  
Then, in February of 1775, North shifted from a policy of coercive legislation to 
colonial conciliation. He offered his Conciliatory Proposal for the American colonies in a final 
attempt at preventing war. Both the title of this resolution as well as the wording suggest that 
Lord North hoped to placate both the interests of his peers as well as the North American 
subjects. The Conciliatory Proposal resolved that if “his Majesty and the two Houses of 
Parliament” approve an American colony’s legislation to “make provision…for contributing 
their proportion to the common defence… for the support of the Civil Government, and the 
Administration of Justice, in such Province or Colony” and if that legislation levied or increased 
a “Duty, Tax, or Assessment,” that “the nett produce of the duties last mentioned to be carried to 
the account of such Province or Colony respectively.”31 By his Conciliatory Proposal, Lord 
North created a solution to the problem of asserting colonial authority in the colonies while 
meeting their demands about equitable taxation. He left the Crown and parliament the ultimate 
                                               
29 John Heneage Jesse, Memoirs of the Life and Reign of King George the Third, Vol. I (London: Tinsley Brothers, 
1867), 489. 
30 Ibid., 560.  
31 Conciliatory Proposal, 27 February 1775, American Archives.  
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authority to approve or disapprove legislation but was promising the colonies the net revenue 
from duties. Yet, the resolution created political backlash which paralyzed North given the 
fragility of the office of the Prime Minister. Not two months later and against the Prime 
Minister’s personal wishes does the susceptibility of his position become obvious when politics 
reigned superior and Lord North approved Great Britain’s declaration of war on the North 
American subjects.  
The Secretaries: The Earl of Hillsborough, a Confident Hawk 
The Earl of Hillsborough stormed into the Prime Minister’s office, bringing with him a multi-age 
proposal. The subject line boasted information pertaining to the North American colonies. The 
Duke of Grafton, Prime Minister before Lord North, did not intimidate the first Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. Hillsborough’s confidence and determination, characteristics which 
influenced his entire tenure as Secretary of State, overshadowed any semblance of trepidation he 
may have harbored in his body.32 Based on these characteristics of the Secretary, it is easy to 
imagine the scene which may have unfolded in the Prime Minister’s office. Lord Hillsborough 
may have presented his proposal then starred the Duke in the eyes with a hawk-like ferocity 
which defied the normal decorum observed between cabinet members and their Prime Minister. 
By 1769, however, Hillsborough witnessed enough. The disruptive actions of the North 
American colonists, especially those committed by the Bostonians, could no longer be tolerated. 
Hillsborough thought the empire needed to be concerned with other more pressing matters such 
as the debate over westward expansion into the Ohio region. To the Secretary, colonial disarray 
was nothing more a distraction obfuscating the King’s ability to strengthen his empire.  
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Hillsborough already ordered Gage to send two regiments to Boston to support the 
civil government and approved the usage of force, if necessary.33 He must have wondered what 
else he could do to subjugate the North American colonies to the Crown swiftly and 
permanently. Perhaps, he could have contemplated as he turned to leave the office, this proposal 
will be enough. While uncertain about the effectiveness of his recommendation, Hillsborough 
was certain about one thing – no matter what, the actions of the colonists were unacceptable and 
they needed to be shown this. Given his known determination, he would not give up until this 
vision for North America was met.  
Testing his limits in the newly created cabinet position, Hillsborough’s proposal for 
America provided recommendations giving the Crown more influencing in selecting political 
appointees, punitive ways to control unruly colonies, and a suggestion to quarter the troops in 
both public and private houses. Both the Prime Minister and King George III thought 
Hillsborough’s proposal too aggressive in 1769.34 The two men lost faith in their newly 
appointed Secretary.  
Lord Hillsborough acted entirely within his rights as the Colonial Secretary by 
submitting a proposal to the Prime Minister. Prior to the creation of this cabinet position in 1768, 
only two Offices of the Secretary of State existed, one for the Northern Department and one for 
the Southern Department, to whom colonial matters used to be addressed. After the riots in 
Boston in the early 1760s, Parliament thought it prudent to establish an entire office dedicated to 
the administration of colonial affairs. Prior to the inception of the American Department, 
officials did not receive instructions from a single department; rather, mother country-colony 
communication was dispersed. “The result of this multiple supervision was that no one 
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department in the government had collected all the information necessary to conduct the affairs 
of a large empire.”35 Said otherwise, information was extremely centralized and widely dispersed 
in the 18th century cabinet. Each man may have held a part of the puzzle but no man held the 
finalized image. All, then, envisioned an incomplete picture of the magnitude and ramifications 
of the events throughout the empire. The creation of a third Secretary of State sought to mitigate 
this confusion. Two undersecretaries worked for the Secretary of State to facilitate the 
communication and information gathering. These undersecretaries normally held similar political 
views to their Secretary. For the Hillsborough years, this meant a conservative triumvirate in the 
American Department focused on the status of Great Britain among other European powers.36 
Generally, the secretary and his undersecretaries played an active role in colonial 
affairs in the prelude to the American War of Independence. They oft formulated “vaguely 
planned or only dimly considered” ideas from whatever ministry they served into acts of 
Parliament or colonial orders. 37 The ability to shape policy, for better or for worse, is significant 
on two levels when considering the role of the Colonial Secretary in contributing to the coming 
of the War. First, it placed extensive power into the hands of the American Department 
administration. Second, verification of the quality of work may not have complimented increased 
agency. The “vaguely planned” and “dimly considered” policies meant not only haphazard 
planning but also haphazard enforcement. In addition to policy making, the Secretaries of State 
also: ordered troop movements, received reports, supervise correspondence, and prepare 
agendas.38 They immediately supervised the Commander in Chief of the British Forces in North 
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America and were in constant communication with both him and the King. Given their wide 
oversight of the colonies, to include the military, an inability to deliberately craft policy would 
have left much room for error in colonial governance and strategy formulation. 
For the Secretaries of State, relationships mattered as their power depended “on 
cordiality between superior and subordinate.”39 This principle held whether the relationship in 
question was that between Prime Minister and Secretary or Secretary and undersecretaries. If 
trust was not created, then the superior would likely not listen to his subordinate. Hillsborough 
laid the groundwork and set the precedent of explicit and implied jobs for future Secretaries of 
State for the American Colonies. His firm, unapologetic policies made him a novel voice during 
a period categorized by caution among the British Decision Makers. Had Hillsborough been the 
Secretary of State in 1774, his recommendations would have likely been heeded. Nevertheless, 
the Secretary’s ambition and firm stance on America eventually led to his dismissal from office 
in 1772. In his place emerged the conciliatory Lord Dartmouth. 
The Secretaries: The Earl of Dartmouth, a Confident Dove 
Five months after assuming his position as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of 
Dartmouth paused to pen his thoughts on the relationship between a government and its subjects. 
October of 1772 proved itself to be a slow month for the American Department which allowed 
for this unusual moment of contemplation. Dartmouth did not intend to keep his reflections 
private, however. Rather, his very personal musings traversed the Atlantic Ocean and landed in 
the hands of General Thomas Gage. “Sir,” he began, “In every society there must be somewhere 
a supreme uncontrollable power, an absolute authority to decide and determine...Legal 
subjugation to legal Government is essential to legal freedom.” With these words, Dartmouth 
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advocated for colonial adherence to English government. Dartmouth continued, “The welfare 
and happiness of all depend upon the punctual and regular discharge of the Duties of each...” The 
colonies must listen to the Administration, just as the Administration must listen to the colonies, 
Dartmouth likely thought. Finishing his letter to Gage, the Secretary urged that prosperity and 
happiness could ultimately, “Only arise from a strict and exact observance (on both sides) of that 
line and law and justice which divided as the authority of the ruling Power on the one hand from 
the Rights of those who are obedience to it, on the other.”40 
Though a note rooted in personal beliefs, Dartmouth wrote to his North American 
Commander in Chief for a reason. Until this point, Gage had only received word of his mission 
in North America – support the civil authorities and maintain the public peace – but not why he 
was to do it. This letter clarified the purpose of the colonial mission. To Dartmouth, the 
maintaining Parliamentary supremacy was the desired outcome of occupation in North America; 
not conflict, violence, or bloodshed. He desired to mend relations between the mother country 
and her subjects by using constitutional principles.41 As would become evident, however, Lord 
Dartmouth spoke a different language than the Americans and his colleagues in London. In 1774, 
just before Gage assumed his titles of Commander in Chief and Colonial Governor, the Secretary 
cautioned the Commander “to use every endeavour to...quiet the minds of the people...and by 
mild and gentle persuasion to induce...submission.”42 Colonial sympathizer, more than any 
Secretary of State in the past, characterized the Earl of Dartmouth’s tenure.43  
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Lord Dartmouth was no stranger to political life before serving as the Colonial 
Secretary. In all his offices, Dartmouth took an economic and diplomatic approach to exerting 
control over the rebellious colonists.44 Dartmouth served as the President of the Board of Trade 
under the Rockingham Government. While President, he oversaw the repeal of the Stamp Act; an 
act he supported out of economic considerations.45 As Colonial Secretary, whether formulating 
policy regarding westward expansion into the Ohio region or responding to colonial insurrection, 
Dartmouth supported measures that would subjugate the colonists to the Crown but would not 
lead to violence.46  
Compared to his predecessor the Earl of Hillsborough, Secretary Dartmouth appeared 
weak and too conscious of colonial sentiment to the rest of the British leadership. Even colonial 
subjects questioned Dartmouth’s abilities. Ben Franklin wrote of Dartmouth in 1773 that he “is 
truly a good man, and wishes sincerely a good understanding with the colonies, but does not 
seem to have the strength equal to his wishes...”47 This weaknesses about which Franklin wrote 
manifested in more non-militant policies proposed by Dartmouth. Perhaps Dartmouth’s pious 
nature as a strict Methodist or his passion for philanthropy also contributed to his even-tempered 
disposition toward the North American colonists.48 Regardless of the reasoning, Parliament and 
the King lost hope in his abilities as the situation in North America turned bleak towards the end 
of 1774. Dartmouth’s conciliatory measures constantly failed as he ultimately was the one to 
order General Thomas Gage to march on Concord in April of 1775.  
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The General: Thomas Gage, an Uncertain Dove 
After a long year away from North America, General Thomas Gage disembarked the HMS Livey 
and strode onto the familiar docks of Boston Harbor. The taste of the salty Atlantic Ocean and 
smells of the bustling fish market overwhelmed Gage’s senses. When he left the colonies in 
1773, Gage bore the sole title as Commander in Chief of the British Forces in North American. 
Now, in 1774, General Gage was also Governor Gage, assuming the dual roles of Commander in 
Chief and Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.49  
Included in Gage’s order were specific instructions to ensure the execution of and “due 
Obedience thereto” the Coercive Acts, most notably, the Boston Port Act.50 Parliament passed 
this Act in response to the destruction of the East India Tea in the Boston Harbor on 16 
December 1773. It was intended to economically pressure the colonists to the supremacy of the 
law. However, of the collection of legislative which comprised the Coercive Acts, the Boston 
Port Act inspired the most controversy among the Americans. The bill closed the Port of Boston 
until Massachusetts Bay could pay reparations to the treasury and the East India Company. Once 
effective on 1 June 1774, economics soon became paramount to the conflict in New England.51 
The new governor, as well as the rest of the administration, initially supported the passage of the 
Coercive Acts to prevent war. General Gage must have thought he possessed at least a basic 
understanding of the situation into which he would enter upon arrival in North America. He 
likely assumed colonial insurrection cold be easily assuaged.  
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In accordance with his assumption, some Bostonians welcomed Gage into their city on 
that May morning. He could hear their acclamations all around as he assumed the governorship. 
One colonist admiringly recounted that the new governor “express’d himself as a servant of the 
Crown,” and confessed that, as such, “he was obliged to see the [Port] Act put in execution...but 
[Gage] would do all in his power to serve us...” the Bostonian sighed in relief.52 However, this 
relief did not last long as Gage began to govern in his new position.  
Even amid the support and excitement, Gage understood the fragility of the situation 
in which he found himself. In Great Britain, opinions of the colonists were shifting from 
understanding to impatient. Meanwhile, conflict plagued the remainder of the British Empire 
which took valuable resources from the force in North America. The General returned to Boston 
ready to rule once again with an iron fist and determined to quickly end colonial subversion, just 
as he did before his reprieve to England.  In October of 1774, he relayed to Lord Dartmouth, “I 
don’t see what else can be done. If force is to be used at length, it must be a considerable 
one…for to begin with small will encourage resistance and not terrify; and will in the end cost 
more blood and Treasure.”53 Seemingly aggressive, this statement actually conveyed Gage’s 
reluctance to use military Force. He feared a lack of deliberate planning in London about how 
and when the military would be used. Moreover, his letter disclosed his general uncertainty about 
how to handle the events unfolding in Boston – a flaw which would eventually be his demise. 
The impermanence of his tyrannical leadership style soon exposed itself. By 1775, Gage found 
himself without a voice in the decision-making process, responding to higher orders to suppress 
colonial insurrection solely out of a sense of obligatory duty.  
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Gage, facing the difficult task of serving as both military commander and civilian 
governor, must have wrestled internally with his dual roles, his confidence wavering. Portrayals 
of the General elucidate his marginal self-assuredness. Some described Gage as having a “tall 
military figure” with “a round face featured by a small weak mouth.” Most everybody liked him, 
as evidenced by the warm welcome Gage received in Boston. General Gage was “a professional 
soldier” who expected the same professionalism from his men. Critics claimed that Gage “lacked 
the subtlety and the strength and the sense of fast maneuver that the situation [in America] would 
soon demand. Worse, in crises he vacillated, and Boston [in 1774] needed firm and careful 
control.”54 Caution and military timidity characterized Gage’s command in the prelude to the 
American War of Independence.55 Ultimately, Gage could be summarized as “the perfect 
peacetime general” with “no talent at all for making war.”56 These characterizations are essential 
for understanding the General’s role in British failure to establish an effective North American 
strategy. While he may have been an effective commander before 1774, once preparations for 
war began to be made in this year, General Gage retreated from the idea of the effectiveness of 
prolonged armed conflict in North America. 
Of anyone in power at this time, Gage should have been the most confident in his 
military abilities. From a noble family of little notoriety, officership emerged as young Thomas’ 
only way to establish a reputation for himself independent of his family’s mediocre status. Thus, 
when Gage turned of age, he purchased a commission and began what would become an 
illustrious career of military service. He first served as an aide de camp in the War of Austrian 
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Succession, then lead General Braddock’s advanced guard unit in the French and Indian War, 
and later raised and commanded the 80th light infantry regiment in North America. He then 
became the wartime governor of Montreal before being promoted to Commander in Chief in 
North America in 1763.57 Well-read in books and treatises on the art of war, military histories, 
and biographies, Gage understood warfare in a variety of contexts.58 Yet, shyness plagued the 
man who the Crown needed to be assertive.  
As the Commander in Chief of the British Forces in North America, General Gage 
held the highest-ranking office in the region. He received his orders directly from the Colonial 
Secretary. Aside from budgetary approval, the British military operated independently of 
Parliament. In accordance with his commission as a British Officer, Gage was legally obligated 
to follow his superior’s orders – regardless of his own opinion.59 However, as military historian 
Ira Gruber explains about the Seven Years’ War, “commanders often had the opportunity as well 
as the political influence and independence of mind to modify strategy to suit themselves.”60 
Gage, an officer serving in the North American area of operations during this war, would have 
understood this ability to operate within his commander’s intent. Thus, though law ordered Gage 
to obey his superior and mission, he also maintained some freedom of thought in which to 
exercise his own command in North America leading to the American War of Independence. 
From his first arrival in North America in the 1760s, confusion around Gage’s 
mission emerged. From 1765 when Parliament repealed the Stamp Act before the military could 
suppress the riots, Britons, included Gage, recognized a shifting military mission in America.61 
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In the face of an uncertain mission, Gage remained certain that he should avoid any actions that 
might initiate bloody conflict between his troops and the American colonists.62 This is evidenced 
by his firm believed that military presence would not cause “inconveniences” or “interrupt a 
quiet and peaceable Election, or render it more free and uninterrupted…” as he “confess[ed]” to 
Governor Bernard in 1769. The General’s confidence stemmed from his perception that “No 
inconvenience has ever been found from the King’s Troops being in other Places in His 
Majesty’s Dominions on Similar Occasions.” Upholding his mission to stabilize Boston, aid the 
civil magistrates, and ensure the execution of the laws, he concluded his letter to the governor 
stating, “I flatter myself [no inconveniences] will be found in Boston” from the presence of 
British forces.63 
A year after his arrival, General Gage maintained a vision and certain understanding 
of why his men occupied the Massachusetts Bay town. They did not remain to cause 
“inconveniences” or inspire violent reactions; rather, the Regulars were to be a stabilizing force. 
However, his vision did not necessarily match that of the Decision Makers in London as the 
years progressed. How Gage and his forces were to execute the original mission of 1768 
progressively obscured as upheaval in the colonies continued. The Commander in Chief’s 
enumerated responsibilities and his ability to do them only grew hazier when he also gained the 
title of Colonial Governor.  
As an officer, Gage could not use troops against civilian disorder; but as Governor, 
could request the ability to do so from his cabinet.64 In a letter from Lord Halifax to Gage in 
1765, Halifax clarified that, for the North American colonies 
                                               
62 Reginald Hargreaves, The Bloodybacks: The British Serviceman in North America and the Caribbean 1655-1783 
(London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968), 212. 
63 Gage to Bernard, 22 May 1769, CO 5/87. 
64 Shy, “Weak Link,” 22. 
WHEN PERSONALITIES DOMINATE, STABILITY FAILS: GREAT BRITAIN’S CHANGING NORTH AMERICAN 
MILITARY STRATEGY, 1768-1775 
 
36 
The orders of the Commander in Chief and of departmental brigadiers were to be 
supreme in military matters. If the brigadier were out of the province, however, a 
governor with the consent of his council might give directions to regular troops when ‘for 
the benefit of his Government,’ though in no case was a governor to interfere with 
regimental administration.65 
 
The role of the governor and of the officer in charge, then, overlapped. This convention remained 
for the ensuing decades. Essentially, Gage simply consolidated powers which already defaulted 
to his control as the Commander in Chief.   
Thomas Gage’s changing opinions on how to handle the budding conflict in America 
from 1768 to 1775 reflect his uncertainty in his persona and confusion over his delegated 
powers. In the late 1760s, Gage actively agreed that the British government needed to take a firm 
stance on American disorder. He advocated for keeping the regulars on the Eastern seaboard in 
Boston and the surrounding cities in case future insurrections needed to be suppressed. When 
ordered to send troops to Boston in 1768 at the request of Governor Bernard, Gage wrote to 
Viscount Barrington, the Secretary at War, “I know of nothing that can so effectually quell the 
Spirit of Sedition...as Speedy, vigorous, and unanimous Measures taken in England to suppress 
it.”66 After Bostonians disposed of the imported tea in 1773, Gage declared to King George that 
the Americans “will be lyons, whilst we are lambs; but if we take the resolute part, they will 
undoubtedly prove very meek.”67 Much like the Monarch in 1775, the General championed force 
throughout 1773 and thought military suppression the only option. 
Yet, in mid-1774 as Parliament and the Crown became more resolute in their coercive 
policies towards North America, Gage became more irresolute in his recommended courses of 
actions. Rather than encouraging England’s new punitive spirit, Gage began to voice reservations 
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about using force in America. He even advocated for the suspension of the Coercive Acts until 
Britain would be actually effective in crushing the rebellion.68 Writing privately to Secretary 
Dartmouth, the Commander expressed that he saw the Crown having only two options: Britain 
either needed to use considerable force, military power they did not have, to stop colonial 
rebellion or release all authority over North America.69 To those in England, this advice came 
across as an excuse. Gage appeared to be losing control of his army throughout 1774. Now, 
British leaders, both military and civilian, “thought Gage’s inaction and conciliatory behavior 
inexcusable, and they howled for his head.”70 From 1774 until his termination in 1775, Gage lost 
the trust and support of not just King George but of nearly everyone in Great Britain. Gage 
appeared too pusillanimous, incompetent, weak, and ineffective. Whether in support of colonial 
suppression or against it, his opinions no longer mattered to the rest of the Ministry.  
When the British regulars first arrived on Boston’s shores in 1768, Gage as the 
Commander in Chief of the British Forces in North American held the power to shape Anglo-
American relations for the decade to come. As historian John Shy explains, “[Gage] could not 
have prevented the American Revolution, but he could, and did, give its beginning a particular 
shape.”71 This statement yields dual importance. Generally, it explains why the Colonial 
Secretary relied so heavily on the observations from the Commander in Chief during the first 
years of the occupation of Boston. The administration assumed an initial show of force would 
deter colonial insurrection; therefore, the military’s presence, not necessarily military actions, 
became the Crown’s primary hope. More specifically, here Shy alludes to General Gage’s role in 
designing a pre-war military strategy for North America. Had the General been resolute in his 
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stance on how to militarily engage with the Americans and clear and consistent on the 
appropriate level of escalation of force to be used, then perhaps the Decision Makers back in 
England could have made cohesive strategies, themselves.  
However, by 1774, Gage’s uncertainty and hesitancy demonstrated when serving as 
both Commander in Chief and Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony essentially lost him 
all the power he once held in influencing the Crown’s course of action. Before this year, the 
Decision Makers took his advice and advocacy for swift action into consideration. However, as 
1774 progressed and the Crown dispatched more generals to New England, England’s distrust of 
Gage’s abilities became ever clearer. By 1775 General Thomas Gage faced the age-old ethical 
dilemma of responding to orders in the absence of the ability to think critically about the 
situation facing he and his men. Though he served as Britain’s eyes and ears in North America, 
on the eve of conflict, the final decision to militarily engage the colonists was not that of the 
General’s doing.  
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
The responsibility for the war in North America did not reside with one man. Rather, 
the combined leadership – or lack thereof – of the King, the Prime Minister, the Colonial 
Secretaries, and the Commander in Chief of the British Forces in North America created the 
perfect clash of perspectives, beliefs, and responsibilities to promote inaction when it came to 
Boston. The increased aggressiveness and impatience of King George III and Parliament, the 
political vulnerability and acquiescence of Lord North and Lord Dartmouth, the military 
weakness and personal uncertainty of General Gage, all culminated in Dartmouth’s signing of 
the letter approving Gage to send the British forces to march on Concord in April of 1775.  
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Moreover, just as one person did not singlehandedly decide to instigate war, conflict 
did not originate solely in response to the events which occurred in Boston between 1768 to 1775 
– especially not in an empire as large as Britain’s in the eighteenth century. Rather, multiple 
events both internal and external to the mother country demanded the attention of each of these 
men. From security threats posed by France and Spain to the British Empire to economic crises 
within England, the personal biases of the political and military Decision Makers influenced their 
reactions to these events and prevented the creation of a cohesive North American strategy at the 
onset of upheaval in the mid-1760s – a preemptive action which may have delayed the 
detrimental blow that the American War of Independence would be to the British Empire.  
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Chapter II: The Neighbors 
“War is the continuation of politics by other means.”72 
 
The global balance of power tilted in Great Britain’s favor after the Seven Years’ War. Fought 
between 1754 and 1763, this global conflict was known as the Seven Years’ War in Europe and 
the French and Indian War in North America. Considered the first world war by many, the Seven 
Years’ War set the geopolitical stage in the pre-War of American Independence era. Out of the 
war emerged new alliances, new enemies, and new complexities for the British Empire. Though 
the Seven Years’ War bolstered British power, the new world order still raised much concern for 
the Crown, his ministers, and the military.  
The Seven Years’ War left France and Spain – Great Britain’s continental neighbors – 
devising ways to reverse England’s post-war victories. Historian Daniel Baugh explains the 
French approach to foreign policy in the interwar years. He asserts that “after losing countless 
colonies to British arms in the Seven Years’ War, French policy was primarily directed towards 
avenging those losses and securing the retention of what remained in French hands.”73 Like 
France, Spain too assumed an agitated and aggressive posturing throughout the world. This 
further signaled to British political and military Decision Makers that the late 1760s and early 
1770s would not be the era of peace for which they longed; rather, it would be one of 
geopolitical strife as France and Spain yielded the ability to regain strength in the regions in 
which King George III maintained vested strategic interest. Arguably, if the Crown had retained 
its territorial gains from the Seven Years’ War, thus keeping France and Spain out of, most 
notably, North America and vital islands which sat dangerously close to British territory, then 
“the fleets of France and Spain would have been permanently at [England’s] mercy” as England 
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would have controlled key global holdings.74 However, British supremacy was soon challenged 
after the first global conflict.  
Baugh explains the intricacy of the composition of the balance of power in the eighteenth 
century. He writes that:  
The balance of power thus conceived was a balance of land power; it took cognizance of 
the size, population, and productive capacity of territories...At a military level, 
calculations were made about the size and military readiness of the standing army, the 
manpower available for recruitment, and the strategic attributes of a state’s location and 
terrain...Although defense was the usual goal, states possessing efficient armies in 
readiness did not mind menacing their neighbours.75  
 
“Menacing their neighbours” is exactly what the French and Spanish did with Great Britain 
while the British pursued territorial defense of their pre-existing and growing empire. Aside from 
engaging with France and Spain, Great Britain also felt military, diplomatic, and economic 
pressure from Russia, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Prussia, Austria, India, and Canada. 
For the purposes of understanding the demands on the British military and Decision Makers, this 
chapter tells the story primarily of the threats on the British Empire created by the Spanish and 
the French. The activity of these nations spanned not only the European continent but also the 
subcontinent of South Asia and the frontier in North America.  
The perception of the strength of Great Britain by other states and, conversely, Britain’s 
perception of other states’ strength mattered as this manifestation, whether real or perceived, 
affected overall British grand strategy and policies. Strategic assessment forced the Decision 
Makers to allocate time, energy, and resources. Yet, each Decision Maker maintained his own 
conflict of interest. The King largely cared about Great Britain’s reputation among European 
superpowers. Economic considerations and the governance of India occupied the Prime 
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Minister’s attention. The Secretaries of State raised concern without focus. Even the Commander 
in Chief found himself occupied with the frontier and the encroachment of European states in 
North America, rather than Bostonian insurrection. While each man was right to focus on his 
enumerated area of expertise, doing this when coupled with no emphases on creating a collective 
shared understanding about the various geopolitical demands on the British Empire further 
hindered the establishment of a cohesive strategy in New England. Ultimately, the decision from 
1768 to 1774 seemed to be one of defending other colonial holdings over attempting to stabilize 
Boston. Diplomacy suffered in the era leading up to the American War of Independence and, in 
its place, emerged multiple conflicts at varying levels of escalation, all with the potential of 
erupting into war. Spanish and French security threats to the British mainland, her allies, and her 
colonies obscured the focus of Great Britain’s military and political Decision Makers as the 
activity of these other global powers implicated political, economic, and military ramifications 
that could not be ignored if the Crown wished to retain his empire.  
Periods of British Foreign Policy 
British foreign policy experienced three distinct periods between 1768 and 1775 which can be 
generally summarized as interventionalist, nonexistent, and isolationist. Foreign policy, broadly 
defined, involved nearly all facets of the royal and political administrations. Policy most notably 
drew on the expertise and guidance of the King, the Prime Minister, the Board of Trade, the three 
Secretaries of State, and the Commanders in Chief of the regions of interest. It was because of 
the structural competing interests of these positions, strong personalities of the people who held 
the positions, and administrative changes that foreign policy witnessed multiple shifts prior to the 
American War of Independence. From 1768 to 1770, under the administration of the Earl of 
Hillsborough and prior to Lord North’s tenure as Prime Minister, King George emphasized an 
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externally focused foreign policy. The European continent experienced prolonged activity which 
consumed British attention – over that of the American colonies. In short, the aim during these 
two years was to end British isolationism on the European continent, especially in the eastern 
area of operations.76  
Then, in 1770, domestic parliamentary issues, upheaval, and the resignation of Lord 
Grafton and confirmation of Lord North as Prime Minister paused foreign policy to allow 
England to overcome its domestic political turmoil. King George even resigned his attention to 
solve parliamentary discord and urged members “...to avoid all Heats and Animosities amongst 
yourselves, and to cultivate that Spirit of Harmony which becomes those who have but One 
common Object in their View…” with the hope that his plea would reorient his administration to 
engaging with the other European super powers, namely France and Spain.77 The King’s speech 
proved fruitless as economic crisis struck Great Britain and the King’s empire in the early 1770s. 
Though conflict still raged throughout the globe, an internal focus characterized the second era 
of British foreign policy from 1771 to 1773.  
Finally, a policy of “splendid isolation” emerged between 1773 and 1775 as 
administration focus shifted to North America. This period began with an emphasis placed not 
on alliances but instead on increasing English naval power.78 The increased activity in North 
America, finally beginning to be perceived as actually threatening to the Crown and England’s 
reputation by 1774, contributed to the final shift in foreign policy. As historian H.M. Scott 
explains in his book on British foreign policy, colonial success was deemed “essential for future 
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credibility in foreign policy.”79 This is so because of both the weak image an inability to govern 
colonies cast to the other world powers as well as the economic costs of managing, or 
mismanaging colonies. King George himself even argued that “we must get the colonies in order 
before we engage with our neighbors.”80 Even though three distinct periods of foreign policy 
emerged in the years leading to Anglo-colonial conflict, the approaches to foreign policy and the 
aims of each period were not agreed upon by everyone in the British government. Each Decision 
Maker held his own agenda that oft removed his attention from the New England colonies – a 
complexity which only added to the confusion over the North American military strategy. 
The Decision Makers and Geopolitics 
The expansive reach of the territory and interests of the British Empire, spanning from the 
continents of Europe and South Asia to the islands of the Caribbean and the sought after 
explored and yet to be explored regions of North America, meant that the Monarch constantly 
assessed the strength of his geographic, political, and economic borders. From 1768 until 1774, 
the priority, in King George’s mind, lay in maintaining the general tranquility and peace of other 
European powers towards Great Britain. In his addresses to parliament, he frequently advocated 
for a European-centric foreign policy and envisioned Britain playing an active role in European 
politics to deter the threat to her security and prosperity posed by France.81  
In an opening speech to a joint session of the House of Lords and House of Commons in 
November of 1768, King George III professed his European concerns. He opened his address 
reaffirming his general commitment to peace. George relayed, “It would have given Me great 
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Satisfaction to have been able to acquaint you, that all the other Powers of Europe had been as 
careful as I have ever been to avoid taking any Step that might endanger the general 
Tranquility…” thus implying that the King’s actions all encouraged peace, contrary to the 
actions of his fellow monarchs. George continued, updating Parliament on notices from the regal 
administrations he just admonished. “I Have constantly received, and do still receive from them, 
the strongest Assurances of their pacfick Dispositions towards this Country.” George surmised 
that his kingdom seemed to be positioned for peace. Yet he made it known to Parliament that he 
remained resolute that “No Assurances, however, shall divert my constant Resolution stedfastly 
to attend the general Interest of Europe, nor shall and Consideration prevail upon me to suffer 
any attempt that may be made derogatory to the Honour and Dignity of My Crown, or injurious 
to the Rights of My People.”82 The King recognized that he needed to maintain a global 
perspective to protect his subjects, as a result of the explicit and implicit responsibilities of his 
position.  
In 1772, King George reaffirmed this commitment in front of Parliament, again 
proclaiming that “I continue to receive from Foreign Powers the strongest Assurances of the 
Pacifick Dispositions towards this country; and it shall be my constant Endeavour to preserve the 
general Tranquillity, as far as is consistent with the Honour of My Crown and the Interests of My 
People.”83 The monarch, therefore, remained committed to peace within and around his borders. 
Yet, peace would be difficult to achieve when discontent plagued a portion of the British Empire 
and no cohesive plan existed. As the hierarchical leader of the Decision Makers, the King’s 
inability to focus attention on one group or region – like North America, for example – meant 
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that strategic cohesiveness would have been nearly impossible given the concurrent activity of 
the French, Spanish, and other European states.  
Yet, the King of England was not the only Decision Maker whose attention would have 
been diverted by global activity throughout the empire. Geopolitical events competed with the 
insurrection in New England for the focus of Lord North, Secretaries Hillsborough and 
Dartmouth, and General Gage. The Prime Minister was a politically vulnerable position, 
contingent on balancing the support of the King and the government. He oversaw the activity of 
the secretaries, to include the Secretaries of State and the Board of Trade, Parliament, and acted 
as a personal advisor to the monarch.84 Legislation for domestic and empire governance occupied 
much of his attention, especially Lord North’s.85 Thus, just like George III, North also needed to 
be globally minded to effectively provide domestic and global oversight.  
Though constitutionally responsible for North America, the Secretaries of State for the 
Colonies were similarly not isolated from the effects of European security threats, especially 
those which occurred on the North American continent between the French, Spanish, and Native 
Americans. The Earl of Hillsborough, the first Secretary of State for the Colonies, faced an 
additional challenge of having to define his role and assert the authority of this new secretaryship 
amid the powers of the Northern and Southern Secretaries of State. At times, the Secretaries of 
State found themselves in conflict with each other over the spheres of influence in conflict 
resolution. Personal desires for power could have overshadowed the larger picture, further 
preventing the creation of cohesive personal and administrational strategies for North America.  
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Finally, General Thomas Gage’s resources, authority, and plans would have been 
influenced by global military engagements. Technically removed from the decisions made 
regarding diplomacy and force outside of North America, as the regional Commander in Chief 
operating a fraction of His Majesty’s forces within a limited budget, the geopolitical decisions 
made in London yielded ramifications for the status of General Gage’s force. Ultimately, 
Spanish and French security threats to the British mainland, her allies, and her colonies 
contributed to preventing the formation of a North American strategy. 
Spain: A Maritime Threat 
Of the multiple geopolitical concerns held by the English on the eve of the American War of 
Independence, Spanish and French global activity, as well as the potential for a powerful Franco-
Spanish alliance, appeared the most concerning to British strategic thinkers. These European 
powers forced England to prepare to fight multiple front wars in Europe, South Asia, the 
Caribbean, and North America. Yet, before assessing the threats in North America, this section 
first engages the conflicts raging throughout the globe external to the contested continent. 
Spain, the lesser threat of the two countries but still a major concern, threatened British 
territory in the southeast of North America and professed the ability to wage naval wars with 
England over island territories. Anglo-Spanish relations are described as “surprisingly good” in 
the mid-1770s. However, as historian Daniel Baugh explains, “Spain had the strongest reasons of 
all the powers for worrying about the growing maritime sway of Britain: Spain’s possessions in 
America supplied both hard money and strategic basis; and, above all, Spain had been steadily 
building up its navy.”86 Thus, the “good” relationship between Spain and Great Britain was still 
tenuous in the minds of both parties and yielded the potential to escalate. Meanwhile, when 
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considered Franco-Spanish relations, Baugh explains that the Spanish began working to build a 
relationship with the French starting around 1758. This is notable for two reasons. The first is 
that beginning of this relationship was considered a major pivot in French foreign policy.87 
Second, this meant that by the time the English executed the first period of foreign policy in the 
pre-war era, that characterized by an external focus, the Spanish and French already built a ten-
year-long alliance. It would have been diplomatically difficult for Great Britain to assert herself 
within this dynamic, especially as conflict arose at the dawn of a new decade.   
Between the Carib War and the Falklands Crisis, the early 1770s experienced Anglo-
Spanish military confrontation. The Carib War, fought from 1769 to November of 1773 between 
the Caribs of St. Vincent and Great Britain, risked potential action by Spanish authorities against 
British subjects in the North American colonies.88 The Secretary of War wrote to Secretary 
Hillsborough in 1772 that, “The King having thought fit upon the representations that have been 
made to His Majesty of the danger to which the Island of St. Vincent is exposed from the hostile 
and rebellious disposition of the Charribs, to signify His Commands that a military Force should 
be employed to reduce them to submission.”89 Thus, the Carib War gained the attention of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies diverting his attention to the small island nation. Aside from 
these orders, this conflict does not seem to frequently appear mentioned in any of the 
correspondences between the Secretaries of State, Prime Minister, Commander in Chief, or the 
King. However, it is still important to mention as a potential threat to the strength and security of 
the British Empire that would have, at the very least, loomed in the back of the minds of the 
political and military Decision Makers. 
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The Falklands Crisis, conversely, occupied the attention of not only King George III and 
Lord North but also the Earl of Hillsborough – a person whose attention should have been on 
monitoring the North American colonies. It raised concerns over the perception of English 
strength and growing Franco-Spanish alliance. For one year, from 1770 to 1771, the Falkland 
Islands unnerved Great Britain, France, and Spain. As Lord Hillsborough explained to General 
Gage in a “Most Secret and Confidential” letter regarding Spanish activity in the Falklands, “so 
violent a proceeding in a time of profound Peace will…be considered as an open Act of 
Hostility.” Gage, therefore, was to prepare a “considerable Naval Armament,” by the orders of 
the King, should war follow. 90Thus, the King, his Colonial Secretary, and the Commander in 
Chief all grew progressively consumed with the impending Anglo-Spanish conflict over the 
British claimed a garrison, known as Port Egmont, on these Spanish-controlled islands located 
off the coast of South America. Seemingly insignificant in the global context, Spain resented 
what was perceived as British occupation and wanted to oust Great Britain from the territory.91  
Drawing on their preexisting relationship, the Spanish sought to involve France in this 
effort. To the British, it appeared the House of Bourbon would be ready to aid Spain in their 
attempted conquest. Nervous and determined to appear strong and maintain her regional 
presence, England quickly escalated force against Spain. Historian Brendan Simms clearly 
explains the Crown’s strategic interest. He writes that “What was at stake here was nothing less 
than the question of hemispheric dominance: the Falklands were a staging post for a British drive 
into the Pacific Ocean around Cape Horn...The British...were determined not to allow another 
slap in the face on Corsican lines...”92 For King George and, more broadly the House of 
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Hanover, the Falklands Crisis was, in part, about upholding a powerful reputation in the eyes of 
the House of Bourbon.  
The British political administration tried varied responses to the tensions over Port 
Egmont. British military policy in the Falklands resembled that of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ in which 
Britain hoped to “force Spain into an early and complete surrender, believing naval and financial 
weakness would ensure the Bourbons would not fight: diplomacy, backed by naval preparations, 
would force Madrid to accept the British demands.”93 Settling on forcing Spain’s surrender 
raised internal conflict between the Southern Secretary of State, Lord Weymouth, and Secretary 
Dartmouth.  
The two men each felt they were responsible for the garrison in the Falklands and could 
not agree over the divide in their spheres of influence. The conflict became so great that King 
George himself became involved. In a letter from the King to Lord Weymouth in September of 
1770, George expressed his vision for the delegation of power between the two Secretaries of 
State. He wrote to Weymouth, ““I thoroughly approve of the openness and clearness with which 
you have, in the enclosed draft, given your ideas to Lord Hillsborough on the necessity of more 
exactly defining your Department…” – the reason the two men stood at odds – “…in case war 
should arise, lest that secrecy and despatch, on which the success of war must so greatly depend, 
should suffer by extending the business to too many offices.” In this statement, the King made 
his concern about the repercussions of a ununified cabinet clear. George III recognized that 
internal strife could jeopardize military operations. He continued to Secretary Weymouth, “Your 
conduct, during the time you have held the Seals, makes me desirous that this affair should be so 
far accommodated...On the other hand, I should be sorry Lord Hillsborough felt himself 
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aggrieved…”94 This letter clearly expresses George’s awareness of the conflict occurring 
between two of his Secretaries of State. The King’s mediation of the secretarial tension in the 
middle of the Falklands Crisis meant that the King was having to navigate both bourgeoning 
international and administrative conflicts. Thus, not only was Lord Hillsborough distracted from 
his secretarial duties pertaining to North America but also was the King in his responsibilities 
and desire to, at this point, appease his North American subjects. Ultimately, by the end of the 
year, the Monarch cultivated a disregard for Secretary Weymouth due to how he handled 
Spanish diplomacy.95 This internal power struggle would have caused a greater rift among the 
already distracted administration, more confusion, and mistrust, all resulting in no cohesion.   
In addition to administrative complications, the Falklands Crisis garnered the Monarch’s 
attention for strategic reasons. In January of 1770, King George III addressed Parliament. He 
again reaffirmed his commitment that “...it has always been my fixed Purpose to preserve the 
General tranquility, maintaining, at the same Time, the Dignity and Honour of My Crown, 
together with the just Rights and Interests of My People…” Yet, this time, unlike in 1768, the 
Falklands Crisis jeopardized the exact subjects George pledged to protect. He expressed that this 
desire to “bring the late War to a happy conclusion must be an additional Motive to make Me 
vigilant to prevent the present Disturbances in Europe from extending to any Part where the 
Security, Honour, or Interest of this Nation may make it necessary for My Crown to become a 
Party.” The Monarch, as confident as ever, wanted to reassure Parliament that, if left to him, 
peace would emerge victorious. He concluded, “The Assurances which I receive from the other 
great Powers, afford me Reason to believe, that My Endeavours will continue to be successful. I 
shall still make the General Interests of Europe the Objects of My Attention, ad while I steadily 
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support My own Rights, I shall be equally careful not to acknowledge the Claims of want other 
Powers, contrary to the Limitations of the late Treaties of Peace.”96  
The King’s emphasis on Europe suggest that his concern lay with Spanish and France, 
not the actions of his North American colonists. In 1772, he again expressed a familiar sentiment 
to his “Lords and Gentlemen.” “…Concerns of this Country are so various and extensive as to 
require the most vigilant and active Attention, and some of them, as well from Remoteness of 
Place as from other Circumstances, are so peculiarly liable to Abuses and exposed to Danger,” 
George spoke in his address to the House of Lords. The King, positioned at the front of the 
Chamber, then declared “that the Interposition of the Legislature for [the Country’s] Protection 
may become necessary: If in any such Instances, either for supplying Defects or remedying new 
Laws, you may depend upon My ready Concurrence in whatever may best contribute to the 
Attainment of those salutary Ends.”97 With that speech, King George III made warfare the 
business of Parliament though the Monarch preserved the right to make peace and war and form 
treaties with foreign power without Parliamentary permission.98 For someone like George who 
valued his autonomy as the reigning King of England to make this concession suggests that the 
multilateral threats facing his empire were becoming too much for the young Monarch to bear; 
and this was before the activity in New England truly crossed his radar.  
Finally, the prolonged engagement with Spain and the desire to end the conflict 
legislatively and diplomatically made foreign policy a priority of the Prime Minister. Prior to the 
era of the Falklands Crisis, Lord North did frequently partake in decision making about foreign 
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policy. Now, however, he chose to play a large role in the final stages of the Falklands Crisis due 
to both his “distrust and dislike” of Southern Secretary Weymouth and “his fear that war would 
destroy his planned financial recovery and his ministry, made him intervene decisively.” Like the 
King, but for economic rather than diplomatic reasons, the Prime Minister’s principal objective 
seemed to be peace with the Spanish and, by extension, the French.99 The controversy over the 
Falkland Islands eventually concluded in 1771. While it did not escalate to a hot war, the Anglo-
Spanish standoff proved to be enough to divert the attention of the British political Decision 
Makers. Spanish posture threatened the neighboring British colonies in North America and the 
Crisis made this ever clearer. If the British wanted to improve their relationship with Spain, they 
would have to create a strategy. Yet, simultaneous conflict with France made developing a 
cohesive strategy for handling both Spain and North America extremely difficult. 
France: An Economic and Diplomatic Threat 
If the Spanish were the lesser threat for England between France and Spain, then the French were 
the greater. France posed a threat to Great Britain in South America, India, Europe, and North 
America making Anglo-Franco relations “the motor nerve of British diplomacy.”100 French 
actions, therefore, dictated many British reactions. Just as the Spanish began to develop a 
relationship with the French in the late 1750s, France too underwent a fundamental shift during 
the same decade. The 1750s witnessed a “permanent conversion of French policy-makers to the 
belief that Britain was, and would continue indefinitely to be, France’s main enemy.”101 Thus, it 
was established in the minds of both British and French Decision Makers that the other country 
was the main and “most serious” threat to their global positioning and prominence.   
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From 1768 to 1770, Anglo-French relations remained “relatively untroubled” though 
“fundamental hostility” had “not been seriously weakened, far less removed, but both states now 
had different priorities and this improved relations.”102 Though the two states were temporarily 
distracted from worrying about the actions of the other, it is important to note that different 
priorities, as Scott describes, did not mean an eradication of underlying tension between England 
and France. Perceived tranquility did not last long as events over this two-year period caused 
resigned coexistence to escalate to aggravated tension.  
The French experienced economic and military, especially maritime, growth throughout 
the eighteenth century which manifested in searching for new trading posts. Much to British 
chagrin, North America and India provided the markets for which the French looked. From 1720 
to 1780, France’s transatlantic trade grew ten-fold with re-exportation of colonial products to 
other European ports growing eight-fold. Compared to Great Britain, this equaled 90% of 
Britain’s re-export trade in the 1780s while French seaborne commerce equaled 80% of Britain’s 
cash value in the same decade.103 France was rapidly growing in economic power relative to its 
Anglo brethren. Fiscal stability also made a commercial case for building a strong French navy 
given the rate of growth of the French Atlantic economy – a statement which could not have 
gone unnoticed in the years preceding the American War of Independence. Yet, France’s 
economic and maritime burgeoning preeminence was only one concern felt by British Decision 
Makers. Militarily, the French also posed strategic threats.  
First came the island threats of the Falklands and at Corsica. The ramifications for the 
British of the Falklands Crisis have already been discussed. Corsica, however, posed a new 
threat. Located off the west coast of Italy, Corsica represented a commercial and military 
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stronghold for Great Britain in the Mediterranean. Yet, by mid-1769, after nearly a year of 
debate, France gained full control of Corsica. This purchase reduced British security in the 
region and left English territory vulnerable to both Spanish and French attacks.104 France’s 
territorial acquisition was of mild concern to British Decision Makers as events in India quickly 
overshadowed the trouble in Corsica. 
The English territories in India acted as prominent commercial bases for the Crown’s 
empire. Thousands of British political officials and regulars occupied India by the turn of the 
nineteenth century as a result of the conflict between Britain and France in the subcontinent.105 
Before this conflict ensued, the British first had to overcome their own difficulties in financing 
and governing British India. Winston Churchill, the future Prime Minister of Great Britain 
explains this in his survey on the history of the Great Britain. He claims that, “To call [British 
acquisition of India] ‘Imperialist expansion’ is nonsense, if by that is meant the deliberate 
acquisition of political power. Of India it has been well said that the British Empire was acquired 
in a fit of absence of mind.”106 The reported sporadic nature by which Great Britain acquired 
India explains many of the challenges Great Britain faced in the subcontinent. Challenges both 
externally with the French and internally with territorial governance created administrative 
puzzles which stole the attention of the King, the Prime Minister, and the King’s military forces.  
Oversight of India primarily fell to Lord North, especially if the problem pertained to 
economics. The King and governors sought his help for governmental and economic reform in 
India.107 As will be discussed in the next chapter, Great Britain faced financial challenges in the 
years leading up to the war with America. Many of these were a result of the business practices 
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of the East India Company which suffered from its own difficulties in 1772. Finances were only 
the beginning of the challenges Great Britain experienced in India.  
Governance of India, too, complicated colonization and sparked tensions which created 
weaknesses in the Crown’s South Asian colonies on which France could capitalize. The Crown 
tried to divide governing responsibilities between the English and Indians but, Churchill 
explains, “Such division of responsibilities could not last, and was soon to create formidable 
problems…”108 Problems that emerged as power struggles between the East India Company and 
London. No more so was this evident than in Bengal starting in 1774 during which a factional 
divide between supporters of governor general Warren Hastings and those appointed to the 
supreme council by Britain under the Regulating Act.109 
In the years leading up to this struggle, the House of Commons became preoccupied with 
investigating governing practices in India, especially Bengal. Proper rule of Bengal was 
extremely important because King George III considered the territory to be, in his own words, 
“‘the capital of our commerce and revenues.’”110 It would have been in the King’s interest to 
retain an economically prosperous colony such as Bengal. Yet, the fiscal importance of the state 
made it a desirable asset for numerous agencies. A general belief that the Crown’s servants in 
Bengal truly represented the Great Britain, not the East India Company surfaced in London. This 
favoritism increased the intra-Anglo tensions throughout British India and, as historian P.J. 
Marshall argues, “In the years of peace, relations between the government and the [East India] 
Company over the defence of India were more fraught than they had been in the Seven Years 
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War.”111 This is so because English presence in India created conflict with both English and 
preexisting Indian powers. Concern arose back in London that the East India Company would 
become involved in a war of “uncertain outcome and enormous cost against formidable enemies 
such as Mysore or the Marathas.” Marshall surmises that, “There could be little doubt that the 
French would intervene in future conflicts with Indian powers and they were likely to launch 
attacks on their own account.”112 Given that the European balance of power relied on land power 
and acquisition, even the perceived threat of a French attack on British territory in India must 
have concerned the Decision Makers.   
The stories of Anglo-Franco and Anglo-Indian relations are inextricably linked by both 
real and imagined French threats in the South Asian subcontinent. British premonition of a 
French threat in India actualized after the First Anglo-Mysore War concluded in 1769.113 Though 
British and Indian violence characterized this war, complications with France primarily worried 
the Crown and his administration. Concern arose over the growing French strength at Mauritius 
throughout 1768. While King George III sent reinforcements to Boston, the French King sent 
reinforcements to Mauritius. The bolstering of French forces alarmed the Madras Council of 
India and, by extension, Britain. The Prime Minister and King had, in reality, been misinformed 
about the actual size of the French force on the island; but the news of French presence, when 
coupled with the reduction of British forces after a year of fighting the Mysore, raised anxieties 
over a potential French invasion of India.114 
                                               
111 Ibid, 218. 
112 Ibid, 211. 
113 The First Anglo-Mysore War was partially responsible for the drastic stock crash of the East India Company and 
the ensuing financial crisis of 1772. The repercussions of which are discussed in Chapter III: The Market. 
114 Fort William – India House Correspondence, v: 1767-1769, ed. N.K. Sinha (Delhi, 1949), 143, 420-1, 470, 494. 
WHEN PERSONALITIES DOMINATE, STABILITY FAILS: GREAT BRITAIN’S CHANGING NORTH AMERICAN 
MILITARY STRATEGY, 1768-1775 
 
58 
Continuation of the First Anglo-Mysore War exacerbated administration fears. Due to 
France’s growing economic and maritime strength, Britain perceived French governors would 
next seek a commercial hold in British India. Bengal, they thought, was targeted. Loss of this 
territory would have destroyed Britain’s position in South Asia. In 1769, the French started to 
fortify the area surrounding Bengali Chandernagore, a principle English trading post. This act 
would have unnerved Indians, East India Officials, and the Decision Makers.115 French activity 
in India began to cease in the 1770s; yet, their actions derailed British ambition enough to 
obscure any inkling of a strategy that King George and his men attempted to develop. Churchill 
poignantly wrote that “It was otherwise in India, where often the fight went on when in Europe 
Britain and France were at peace.”116 Thus, the general tranquility for which King George III 
hoped never actually met the English Empire in the prelude to the American War of 
Independence. The fight over India constantly threatened the English economy, commerce, 
territorial holdings in South Asia, and global reputation.  
Like India, French activity and power also determined Anglo-Russo relations. The 
Russo-Turkish War dominated eastern Europe from October 1768 to July 1774. This 
engagement, especially at its beginning, cultivated British foreign policy interest in Russia and 
Britain began to pursue a Russian alliance in 1768.117 Only by further analyzing Anglo-Franco 
relations in this period can inquirers truly understand why this shift eastward, parsing the focus 
of British political Decision Makers, occurred. It was the general perception among ministers 
that the French were the “real instigator of the conflict [in the Balkans] and this added to their 
anxieties.” 118 Therefore, Britain championed a more active Mediterranean policy from 1768 to 
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1770. Diplomatic efforts from the King himself focused on persuading the Porte to make peace 
with Russia. Great Britain served as the mediator between the conflicting nations to both 
intimidate France and draw closer to Russia, playing on dual Anglo and Russo anti-French 
sentiments.119 Yet, when Great Britain offered aid to a Russian fleet in 1769, diplomatic efforts 
failed as the Porte perceived this as British favoritism and bias towards their adversary. France 
then capitalized on the opportunity to gain the favor of the Porte lost by Britain. 
By 1770, war with France felt closer than ever. The appearance of the Russian fleet in the 
Mediterranean Sea led Great Britain to enter brinksmanship with France in the region. Tensions 
and anxieties continuously increased. Back in Great Britain, however, the Monarch setoff to 
assure Parliament that all fared well in the British Empire. In a speech during a final session to 
the House of Lords in 1772, King George offered that “…I can with great Pleasure acquaint you, 
that the Disposition of the Powers of Europe give Me the strongest Reason to believe that this 
Nation will not be disturbed in the Enjoyment of the Blessings of Peace.”120 Meanwhile, while 
the King attempted to persuade his the House of Lords that Britain would see a time of peace, 
France, evasive of stopping Russia, seemed to support the Turks while Great Britain prepared to 
reinforce British fleet in the Mediterranean because leaders thought France would embark on 
naval action.121  
It is difficult to imagine that King George was unaware of the actual situation in the 
Mediterranean. These preparations for war required the attention, time, and resources of the 
King, Prime Minister, Secretaries of State, and regional military commanders. Actions taken to 
deter the French meant that fewer resources existed to support any action, let alone a cohesive 
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strategy, in North America. By 1773, both powers – England and France – stepped down from 
the brink. Tension remained but Lord North professed a particular confidence that France would 
maintain a weak foreign policy on the eve of the American War of Independence as the French 
suffered from their own economic strains and Great Britain retained sea superiority.122  
The North American Frontier: The “Other” War for American Independence 
Many of the global powers demonstrated continued interest in North America during the pre-war 
era. French and Spanish presence along the frontier of the British colonies disrupted the balance 
of power between the Anglo-colonists and Indians who occupied the contested territories. This 
only further complicated the internal tension held by King George regarding his holdings in 
North America and exacerbated the divisions within his cabinet. The story of the North 
American frontier provides an example of the global complexities faced by British Decision 
Makers on the Eve of the American War of Independence. Its narrative, laden with conflict, 
alliances, and betrayal, brings together the Decision Makers and offers an alternative reason as to 
why continental events prevented these men from developing a cohesive strategy for ending the 
rebelliousness in Great Britain’s New England colonies.  
Frontier activity, old as colonization itself, meant North America could not escape the 
European threats from 1768 to 1775. The debates across time and space between King George, 
Lord North, the Secretaries, and Commander in Chief Gage acutely illuminate the complexity of 
British foreign policy. They provide a lens through which to assess Anglo-Franco, Anglo-
Spanish, Anglo-Native, and Anglo-Anglo relations – within the administration – and further 
suggest why creating a cohesive strategy proved so difficult.   
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After the French and Indian War, at least eight Native American tribes shared a 
theoretical boundary with European colonists.123 The Proclamation Line of 1763, an imaginary 
line drawn after the French and Indian War, technically prohibited Englishmen from settling 
west of the Appalachian Mountains. Yet, the Line wielded little authority as both individual 
colonists and members within the Crown’s circle tested the legitimacy of this prohibition. The 
Line also failed to solve the debate over the contested middle region of the continent. The 
Decision Makers viewed the middle Mississippi as “disarray.” According to accounts, border 
security was sparse with only “several dozen soldiers and officers, scattered among a few 
isolated and undermanned forts, were charged with bringing order to the entire region…” which 
spanned the length of North America. The distance between posts made it “impossible” to 
effectively impose British policies on English colonists.124 Historian Brendan McConville 
explains that “As population continued to expand and interest in securing orderly control of 
western lands sharpened, confronting the threat posed by the French and Native Americans 
became critical to all Britons.”125 The debate of westward expansion and, by extension, outright 
defiance of King George III’s policies, heightened Anglo-Native American tensions, introduced 
new threats to the British Empire, and added another task to the ever-increasing list of demands 
facing the Decision Makers in the late 18th century.  
Under both Hillsborough’s and Dartmouth’s tenures as Colonial Secretary, to include the 
command of General Gage and the oversight of Lord North, the question of whether the Crown 
should seek to expand his empire west into North America plagued the minds of the political and 
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military Decision Makers even as conflict began to spark in New England. Concern over both 
territorial acquisition for the Crown and competition with France and Spain over North America 
expanded the North American conversation past that of actions in New England. In 1768, 
Secretary Hillsborough assured a concerned General Gage that, “...His Majesty’s servants have 
not been inattentive to the Dangers that threatens the colonies from those jealousies, which seem 
at present to influence the conduct of the Savages.”126 Thus, Decision Makers were aware of the 
myriad complexities in the New World. With that said, prior to 1772, official English frontier 
policy abided by the divisions drawn by the Proclamation Line. Once Britain controlled North 
America, the King issued a royal proclamation preventing colonists from purchasing land on the 
frontier and prohibiting colonial settlement. Hillsborough, too, maintained a weary demeanor 
towards westward movement.127  
He diligently upheld the Board of Trade’s anti-expansionist policies, opposing all 
proposals aimed at colonizing the North American frontier and beyond. Instead, Hillsborough 
supported settling and developing the coasts. He supported limited expansion for two main 
reasons. First, the Colonial Secretary constantly considered Spain’s position in relation to Great 
Britain. When it came to the Spanish in North America, Hillsborough sent General Gage a letter 
marked as “most secret” with a specific warning. In 1771, we wrote, “In this situation it has 
become necessary to give full scope to the Consideration not only of those measures which it 
may be proper to pursue for the Defense and Security of His Majesty’s Possessions,” those 
facing a Spanish threat on the eastern seaboard, “but also in what places the Enemy may be 
annoyed and attacked with the greatest Advantage and best Hope of success…” Hillsborough 
wanted his Commander in Chief to take “absolute steps…preparatory to any Enterprise that may 
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be undertaken.”128 When assessing the battlefield and templating the enemy – Spain – focusing 
military efforts and development along the coast would have seemed to be the clear course of 
action to Lord Hillsborough. Doing this would have most effectively postured Great Britain to 
defend against Spain. Second, focusing on our coastal territory, the secretary must have 
believed, will extend our commerce and navigation and bring economic prosperity to the Crown 
and the English people.129 He understood the problems of westward expansion and likely 
assessed that London was not focused enough to be able to effectively and efficiently overcome 
them.  
Hillsborough’s policies prohibiting the formation of markets between colonists and 
Native Americans caused problems, too. Many colonists formed companies which bought 
frontier land from the Indians and settled west of the Proclamation Line regardless of policy.130 
P.J. Marshall argues that Hillsborough’s inability to “control events on the frontier and because 
his political colleagues could not resist the blandishments of the speculators” were the primary 
reasons his restrictive policies ultimately failed.131 Even the political administration considered 
anti-expansionism to be controversial. Eventually, this internal conflict became too much for 
Lord Hillsborough. 
Then, in 1772, the first Colonial Secretary resigned and the Earl of Dartmouth became 
the second Secretary of State for the Colonies. With this administration change also came policy 
change. The disposition of Native American tribes as well as Lord Dartmouth’s personal motives 
inspired a shift from anti-westward movement to pro-expansion. By the time the new secretary 
assumed office, an aggressive tread of Indian nativism had developed which preached that “if the 
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English, France and Spain are at war[,] all the red people is to be to peace.”132 The Native 
Americans theorized that warring nations would be to their benefit as it meant Great Britain, 
France, and Spain would be too preoccupied with defeating one another to continue to impose on 
Native lands. It seemed that the Native Americans resolved to encourage European fighting in 
North American and would do nothing to halt it. Moreover, increased Native aggressiveness was 
also evident in that some tribes advocated for military solutions against settlers moving west 
while others abandoned their alliance with Britain and instead sought partnership with other 
tribes and Spain.133 
Lord Dartmouth, however, did not support Native independence from the empire; but he 
did hold sincere concerns for the Indians and their welfare. His support for expansion lay in the 
realization that colonists would continue to move west, regardless of official policy. Thus, the 
government, thought the Colonial Secretary, needed to be involved to facilitate responsible, 
nonviolent migration that protected the Native Americans and aided the English colonists.134 Yet, 
in 1774, the Earl of Dartmouth’s dreams of expansion dwindled as events in New England 
shifted the Decision Maker’s attention and brought Lord North into the North American scene.   
In May of this year, Lord North made it clear to the House of Commons that North 
America finally demanded his attention. Before 1774, India and the Falklands occupied the 
Prime Minister’s attention. Now he proposed the Coercive Acts – a set of legislations intended to 
economically and politically subjugate North America to parliamentary authority – and declared 
that “‘We must decide whether we will govern America or whether we will bid adieu to it, and 
give it that perfect liberty…” The concern, in North’s mind, emerged as a zero-sum equation of 
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“[U]nless [the Americans] see you are willing and able to maintain your authority, they will at 
least in Massachusetts Bay, totally throw it off.’”135 At the same time that he implored 
Parliament to take a stance – any stance – on the affairs in North America, Lord North 
maintained his global focus. He also advocated for measures to curb French progress. The 
Quebec Act hindered the French in North America by internally regulating governance of 
Quebec while also reconfiguring Quebec’s borders to include the disputed Ohio territory. This 
“threatened an encirclement of the thirteen colonies by an absolutist government – a resurrected 
new France; it restored the pre-1763 threat.”136 While Lord North may have been trying to 
diminish French power in Canada to prevent another Anglo-Franco war on North American soil, 
his actions only further fueled colonial and frontier unrest. 
Thomas Gage, the Commander in Chief of the British Forces in North America, also 
expressed his opinions about settlement of the frontier throughout 1768 until the eve of the 
American War of Independence. Given that it would be his men and supplies used to protect and 
defend any new settlements, General Gage took a general opposition to the idea of expansion. As 
early as 1764, General Gage wrote to representatives of the Crown that Britain should give up its 
western fortifications. British regulars were no match for the native tactics. This attitude 
continued into 1769 when Gage wrote to Hillsborough in February that “There is no good 
Prospect that the Commerce of the Mississippi will prove of much Advantage to Great 
Britain.”137 As an officer charged with the care of soldiers, General Gage must have been 
concerned about the costs of engaging in what he perceived to be a futile conflict. As such, it can 
be imagined that Gage may have exasperatedly contemplated, why sacrifice the young men, 
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deplete the King’s resources, and over-expand my forces to a vulnerable state, when penning 
this opposition letter. A year later, the general again wrote to the secretary that “‘There is little 
appearance that the advantages will arise from [expansion], which nations expect, when they 
send colonies into foreign countrys...’” While the rest of the administration debated frontier 
policy, to General Gage, negotiating with the Native Americans and moving west seemed 
fruitless endeavors. Instead, he resigned to “‘Let the savages enjoy their desarts in quiet.’”138 
General Gage entertained enough to worries before considering how to navigate Anglo-Native 
relationships. Leaving the Native American tribes alone seemed to be the best course of action 
for the British Regulars. 3000 miles away in England however, administrative divide created by 
expansion comprised only one of the many complications in the North American backcountry. 
French and Spanish presence also jeopardized British security and commercial activity by 
establishing alliances with Native tribes and preventing English traders from conducting 
business. The Crown and his officials assumed that Native tribes would support the British if any 
English garrisons faced threats, especially in the Gulf, in return for British monetary and military 
aid.139 Native Americans disproved this theory in the pre-War period by cultivating relationships 
with powers outside of the British Empire.140 France posed a threat in North America militarily 
around Canada and economically in Hudson’s Bay. Spain, though, emerged the real British 
regional adversary. In 1770, General Gage observed to Lord Hillsborough that Spain and 
England would be “mutually endeavoring to cultivate the Friendship of every Indian Nation, far 
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and near” as long as the Mississippi River separated the two countries.141 This theory rang 
dangerously true.  
Numerous tribes to include the Creeks, Osage, and Chickasaw all allied themselves with 
Spain as Great Britain gained power in North America. The Creeks emerged Spain’s greatest 
Native ally, especially as they felt progressively endangered and financially crippled as British-
Colonial conflict crept southward.142 Creek anti-Anglo sentiment began in the mid-1760s when 
the Creek governor told the British that “if any white people settle beyond” the Proclamation 
Line and the mutually agreed upon sliver of land fifteen miles in from the coast of Florida, 
British officials “shall never enquire how they came to be killed.”143 Creeks directly threatened a 
British presence in their territory. General Gage advised respecting Creek land and trade. He also 
frequently alerted the Colonial Secretary of the potential for conflict with the tribe.144 Yet this 
initial threat burgeoned into Anglo-Native conflict in the early 1770s.145 Where the British were 
really concerned was in what a Spanish-Creek alliance meant for Anglo-Spanish relations in the 
New World.  
Creek territory in Louisiana was strategically important for King George III’s empire.146 
Spain also envied the geopolitical disposition of the Native peoples, especially as their 
partnership might have enabled Spanish ousting of their British neighbors, thereby allowing 
Spain to accomplish her imperial goals in North America. Correspondence between London and 
the Spanish minister only escalated this threat. Lord Hillsborough relayed to General Gage his 
concern that the Spanish minister’s language was “not favourable to pacification” and that the 
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commander should prepare to increase armaments in North America, depending on Spanish 
actions.147 Thus, the hostile interactions with Spain raised alarm among the Decision Makers and 
diverted their attention to south east North America. The desire for Creek territory only increased 
the pressure mounting between these two super powers. 
The Creek worked closely with the Spanish located in Havana, Cuba – a powerful city 
comparable to that of British controlled Charleston, South Carolina.148 Estimaslayche, the Creek 
warrior leader, even went to Havana and assured the Spaniards that “his men were charged with 
patrolling the entire Florida Gulf Coast, ready to attack any and all English fishermen and 
colonists” in 1773.  He informed Spain that his men planned to declare war against the British in 
the Spring until they “destroyed [the British] entirely.149 The King of Spain even admitted to 
wanting to avenge the British for Spanish losses in the Seven Year’s War but declined to help the 
Creeks.150 Nevertheless, the threat of Creek-Spanish military alliance and potential war with the 
Creeks loomed in the minds of the British Decision Makers. 
The Osage and Chickasaw Indian tribes provide two more examples of Spanish allied 
Natives who hindered Anglo-Native relations and trade. The Chickasaw especially illuminate 
this trend. Attempting to foster a working relationship with the tribe consumed English attention 
in the Gulf Coast.151 One tribe, the Cherokee, did remain loyal to the British colonists. Cherokee 
leader Attakullakulla worked with the Englishmen due to economic necessity. In mid-March of 
1775, the Cherokee signed an agreement, against the King’s will, with colonists to move 
westward.152 Increased Spanish activity concerned British political and military Decision Makers 
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as it threatened English North American colonies, trade and commerce, and Anglo-Native 
relations. 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
By the time King George began serious preparations for war with his North American 
subjects in 1774, the American War of Independence was only a year away. For the seven years 
preceding British armament for colonial war, the King, the Prime Ministers, the Secretaries of 
State for the Colonies, and the Commander in Chief of British Forces in North America had been 
focused on almost anything but the uprisings in Boston and the surrounding New England 
colonies. When New England did capture their attention, it did so amid the backdrop of multiple 
geopolitical threats. France, Spain, Native Americans, India, Russia, and multiple other 
European Countries diverted the focus, both collectively and individually, of British political and 
military Decision Makers.  
Decision Makers needed to look critically at where and how limited resources would be 
spent from 1768 to 1775 to respond to the various geopolitical threats facing the British Empire. 
Simms summarizes this dilemma well by recounting, “But in its origin and essence, the struggle 
in America was a particularly drastic form of debate between two visions of British grand 
strategy;” one American-centric and one empire-centric.153 Either approach ended in warfare 
because of failed diplomacy and, more importantly, failure to create a unified vision for British 
foreign policy. The security threats to the British mainland, her allies, and her colonies presented 
the Decision Makers with complex challenges competing for their attention against the rising 
insurrection in New England. However, the influence of global geopolitical events did not stop in 
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the worlds of warfare and diplomacy; rather, many of these engagements the 1760s and 1770s 
precipitated economic challenges for the Crown. 
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Chapter III: The Market 
“Wherever we find agreeable manners, there commerce flourishes; and that wherever there is 
commerce, there we meet with agreeable manners.”154 
 
The Seven Years’ War financially burdened Great Britain and the North American colonies. 
Between fees paid to the Indian negotiating party, the assumption of previously French-owned 
territory in North America, and the responsibility of the Crown to protect the western frontier 
along the Proclamation Line, England faced unparalleled expenses when it came to North 
America.155 Immediately after the Seven Years’ War, Britain’s national debt doubled to 
£133,000,000.156 Attempting to alleviate some of this debt, English Treasury officials shifted 
colonial policy. Britain revived manufactured export and re-export trade. The colonial revenue 
system was reorganized to make the plantation duty profitable for the Crown.157  
These policies all placed the burden of English debt on the colonists. To the Decision 
Makers, this appeared a fair exchange given that it was the colonists that the British forces were 
sent abroad to defend.158 The logic followed that security increases regional efficiency and 
productivity. Colonial profits would then increase. Defense would be funded by greater taxation 
of North America. Britain then would not be fronting the finances to fund defense while 
simultaneously reaping the benefits of profitable colonies.159  
Part of the policy changes also included British Decision Makers, especially the King, 
taking more centralized control of the colonies. With these policies in place, the mercantile 
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system in North America began to solidify. Yet, British mercantilism exhibited its own unique 
flaws. Financial crises, colonial uprisings, and the costs of running a global empire exposed the 
weaknesses of the English economy during the pre-War years. The domestic financial disarray 
experienced in England influenced British political Decision Makers, each in their own way, 
distracting them from establishing a unified military strategy in North America. Ultimately, the 
story of the coming of the American War of Independence would not be complete without an 
assessment of the British economy and the domestic distractions it caused.   
British Colonial and Commercial Policy 
Mercantilism dominated British colonial and commercial policy by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. Mercantilist theory asserts that trade supported by protectionist government 
policies is the key to national wealth. Though never legislated as official English policy, the 
British Empire adopted mercantilism as its predominating trade policy, especially when 
interacting with her colonies and considering how best to meet the needs of the growing and 
expanding British state, both at home and abroad.160 In theory, a mercantilist system should 
promote peace as it encourages economic interdependence and cooperation between nations.161 If 
this is true, then the converse also holds that a closed system begetting economic isolation within 
an empire would promote conflict when one party feels neglected, betrayed, or refuses to 
comply. With these principles of mercantilism in mind, the story of English financial strain 
begins to unfold.  
The mercantilist system gave rise to a British trade route which spanned European and 
African countries, China, and, most notably, British India, and North America by the 1770s.162 A 
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system as large as Great Britain’s trade network required deliberate and clear leadership to 
ensure smooth execution. Originally, the Privy Council assumed responsibility for the 
administration and oversight of English North American trade. However, the clarity of to whom 
the Crown delegated authority was quickly obscured as the century progressed and the North 
American colonies rose in economic prominence. In addition to the Privy Council, the Lords of 
Trade, in conjunction with the Prime Minister, also legislated trade policy. The Lords of Trade 
wielded a collective reputation for being “consistently mercantilist in its relations to trade and the 
colonies” and “conservative in its defense of the King’s prerogative in America.”163 Many 
members championed these policies as they were more concerned with diplomacy and 
commercial interests, fields in which they could garner power or wealth, rather than empowering 
plantations as seats of governance.164 This emphasis would have contributed to Great Britain 
fronting most of the costs of crippled North American trade as the War drew nearer.  
The Townshend Acts of 1764 to 1766 added another organization to the already large 
cohort dedicated to colonial and commercial policy. The Acts established the American Board of 
Customs Commissioners. Holding its first session in November of 1767, this Board focused on 
tightening financial regulation and oversight in North America.165 Then, in 1768 with the 
creation of the Office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, financial regulative power was 
again diffused as the Colonial Secretary was awarded economic authority in North America. 
British merchants, who adopted the title of ‘mercantilists,’ also felt they deserved a say in 
colonial trade policy as they directly dealt with the colonists. The mercantilists, like the Lords of 
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Trade, argued for the Crown and Parliament to exert more control over the colonial economic 
administration; thereby taking control away from colonial governors.166  
This movement contributed to the growing rift between mainland England and her 
colonies and inspired political lobbying efforts which further acted as a distraction for the 
Decision Makers as they considered various courses of actions in North America. Ultimately, the 
combination of the Privy Council, Lords of Trade, Board of Customs Commissioners, and Office 
of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in developing trade policy, coupled with the political 
pressures created by the mercantilist groups, generated confusion over the delegation of power in 
regulating and overseeing the North American financial systems. Moreover, the continued 
confusion would have negatively affected the key Decision Makers intimately involved in these 
organizations such as the Prime Minister and Secretary of State and, by extension, the King. This 
distraction created by the structure of the colonial trade system contributed to the failure of 
British leaders to establish a consistent North American military strategy. 
Imperative to understanding British pre-War mercantilism is identifying the four “self-
evident” truths which characterized governmental policies towards colonies. First, colonial 
interests and advantages were to be subordinated to those of Britain. Second, Britain asserted a 
right to restrict the trade of the North American colonies to her own mainland subjects. This 
manifested in an English monopoly over colonial output and carrying trade. Third, any surplus 
commodities of the colonies should be sent solely to the mother country. Finally, all trade and 
resources of the North American colonies should be kept from competing rivals.167 With these 
guiding truths, Britain constructed a closed economy with North America in the pre-War period 
of 1768 to 1775. Resulting from an increased governmental interest in North America, the 
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Crown proceeded to trade only within his own empire in an attempt to exclude all foreign 
markets and influences and develop a system which benefitted Britain and tilted the balance of 
trade in the motherland’s favor.  
Mercantilism took a specific form in British North American-mainland trade. When 
functioning, England was meant to be a “self-sufficing” empire in which the different colonies 
each contributed their products, such as food or textiles, to the mother country. In theory, Britons 
would never have to seek outside of the empire for goods. Ultimately, the colonial and domestic 
markets “formed a single economic and commercial whole, made up of widely scattered but 
cooperative members, each of which contributed something to the strength and profit of the 
whole.”168 What emerged was a closed economic system between Great Britain and her colonies.  
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This dependence caused two major problems. First, it gave way to an increased 
Anglicization, or British identity, in the minds of the North American colonists. As economic 
historian T.H. Breen explicates, “The Anglo-American consumer society of the eighteenth 
century drew the main-land colonists closer to the culture of the mother country” from the 
creation of a shared experiential framework” created by the use and appreciation of similar 
goods. This gave the Americans a “means to communicate across social and spatial 
boundaries.”169 The American subjects, therefore, envisioned themselves as British, speaking the 
same commercial language, and perceiving kinship through shared values. Conversely, England 
did not share this mindset. Rather, due to the belief in the supremacy of the “self-evident” truths 
of colonial trade, English authorities regarded the colonies solely as a source of raw materials for 
England, not as the foundations for an expanded empire.170 The Crown never viewed the 
colonists as an extension of the British people; only as an extension of British commercial 
exploits.  
The asymmetric views of the colonists and their ruler are emblematic of the disconnect 
between the Decision Makers in Whitehall and the subjects in North America. While the 
colonies sought regard as economic and political equals, the Decision Makers, especially the 
Colonial Secretaries, thought otherwise when considering subjugation to the law. Lord 
Hillsborough expressed his perspective in the London Magazine. He wrote, “The right to tax to 
be included in the general supremacy, and the alteration of charters, and the force necessary to 
carry either or both into effectual execution to flow consequently from the supreme power of the 
state over the several component parts of the Britannic empire.”171 This perspective which held 
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that Parliament, not the colonial assemblies, should be the ultimate ruling body, was shared by 
much of the British leadership in this time. To both Secretary Hillsborough and then Secretary 
Dartmouth, England’s right to tax the colonies seemed to be a natural right when considering 
their understanding of the mother country-colony relationship. Taxation would have been an 
obvious revenue source for the Crown. The Decision Makers did not foresee the ideological 
implications; rather, fame and fortune obscured their perspectives.  
Moreover, the opportunity for profit and global prestige resulting from colonial holdings 
would have influenced the political and military leaders as they made decisions leading to war. 
As another economic historian Ralph Davis explains, colonial trade “contributed heavily towards 
that general spiral of development, that expansion of demand, which was fact making England an 
industrial nation.”172 This reliance on colonial trade for the financial well-being of the mother 
country meant that any fragility in the colonial market would yield negative ramifications back in 
Great Britain, too. As it was, development, profit, and industrialization, not the colonists’ 
English identity, were the government’s primary concern. A concern which catalyzed the second 
ramification of the of the closed North American-mainland economy. 
The mercantilist circuit left the British economy extremely fragile to economic volatility, 
whether domestic or foreign. In times of peace, the British Empire could be “self-sufficing.” 
However, the system was not designed to absorb the shock of colonial discontent or financial 
crises. While England may have encouraged free trade within its empire, the mercantilism of the 
eighteenth century still limited economic expansion as Great Britain relied on its own subjects 
rather than the foreign markets. Due to the closed market between England and her colonies, 
especially as Parliament increasingly restricted North American colonial trade to be solely with 
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England as the American War of Independence drew nearer, if the colonial purse suffered, so too 
did the Crown’s.  
Challenges of the East India Trading Company 
Great Britain primarily relied on the East India Company to facilitate trade with her colonies 
around the globe. Once a private company, by 1768, the East India Company was well on its way 
to assumption by the English government. The Bank of England, one of the largest financial 
entities in the country, made large loans to both the government and the East India Company. 
Davis explains this investment originated from “The rapidly expanding industrial production of 
the later eighteenth century” which “revealed a new need for circulating as well as fixed 
capital.”173 No longer did financing trade fall on the merchants themselves; rather, as industry 
increased, so too did the responsibility of state-sponsored or affiliated organizations to fund 
ventures. Increased government intervention made the government in addition to the merchants 
susceptible to market fluctuations.  
In theory, removing independent groups from the mercantilist trade circuit should have 
increased market efficiency between Britain and the North American colonies as it established a 
direct link between the supplier and the demander of goods. Commerce should have flourished, 
in the words of Montesquieu, without an intermediary market obfuscating the economic 
relationship between Great Britain and her North American colonies; and therefore, to continue 
Montesquieu statement, should have beget a cycle of peace. This may have been a partial reality 
but economies do not operate in a vacuum. In the closed mercantilist system, reliance on a 
single, nearly government-ran company such as the East India Company left the market 
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susceptible to financial pressures. Yet, the British Empire seemed invincible, especially to 
something as seemingly small as a market shock.  
Then, in June of 1769, the East India Company’s stocks plummeted. This marked the 
beginning of a financial crises which reached its zenith in 1772. To save the company and right 
the economy, the British government officially brought the East India Company entirely under 
government control.174  
This act of government intervention proved to be of no avail under the weight of the Company’s 
failing finances. Rather, the financial crisis lead to many companies filing for bankruptcy due to 
the drastic fall in the East India Company’s stock. According to King George III, England 
suffered from a “fresh stagnation of Credit” and could not seem to recover.175 From 1772 to 
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Figure 3. The Public Entity Model depicts one potential weakness of 
British colonial trade. This model demonstrates the susceptibility of the 
British-American mercantilist cycle to market volatility and the negative 
economic impacts which can follow.  
WHEN PERSONALITIES DOMINATE, STABILITY FAILS: GREAT BRITAIN’S CHANGING NORTH AMERICAN 
MILITARY STRATEGY, 1768-1775 
 
80 
1774, British European produce exports also consistently fell.176 This lack of revenue magnified 
the effects of the East India Company’s default. Additionally, civil disobedience in Great Britain 
accompanied the ever-increasing economic problems. Unemployment caused unrest, unease, and 
anxiety; workers went on strike and petitioned the government as food prices soared; desperation 
led to acts of aggression, especially by weavers, coal-heavers, and tinners which resulted in 
suppression by force. Industry stagnated as crisis after crisis occurred.177 England’s economy 
took hit after hit; making prolonged stability operations in Boston less and less feasible as 
resources dwindled and attention shifted inwards to the domestic economy.  
Inconsistency in both the financial and government sectors contributed to the magnitude 
of the economic crisis. Financially, England constructed a fragmented financial structure, even in 
1774 on the eve of the War for Independence.178 Politically, the Decision Makers were distracted 
in focus and could not agree on how to handle the financial crisis and the East India Company in 
North America and India.179 Political infighting over the economic crisis exacerbated the 
inability to create a strategy for North America. It is in this period that we begin to see different 
schools of thought clearly emerge within the administration on taxation or economic sanctions 
versus military force.  
Altering colonial taxation and regulatory measures became one response to this crisis. 
The Tea Act, proposed by Lord North and later passed by Parliament in May of 1773, was meant 
to provide the East India Company an outlet at which the Company’s surplus tea could be 
purchased inexpensively. The Act designated the North American colonies this outlet. Lord 
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North assumed that providing the Americans limitedly taxed tea would incentivize the colonists 
to conduct legal trade, especially with the East India Company, then profits and, in turn, stock 
prices should have risen again. This economic Act, seemingly uncontroversial, inspired division 
within the royal administration, especially between the Prime Minister and the Colonial 
Secretary. A divide which moved the Decision Makers further from unity. While Lord North 
defended the Tea Act, and adamantly stated that, “I must see a very substantial reason before I 
part with a fund so applicable to the support of Civil [Government].”180 Down the hall in his 
London office, the Secretary of State for the Colonies maintained a different attitude towards 
solving the financial crisis.  
As the debates about the Tea Act raged, Lord North kept Secretary Dartmouth in the dark 
about the policy which would eventually escalate controversy in the Secretary’s colonies. The 
Treasury regarded the Tea Act as a revenue bill which, therefore, did not concern the Colonial 
Secretary.181 Perhaps not malicious, this is one example of the inefficiency and oversight oft 
experienced in the British government. When the opportunity came for Dartmouth to voice his 
opinion on the Act, however, he consistently remained in opposition. Even in to 1774, Lord 
Dartmouth confided in the retired Southern Secretary, Lord Shelburne, of his “determination to 
cover America from the present storm to the utmost of his power, even to repealing the Act.”182 
Remaining true to his dove-like character, Lord Dartmouth sought to aid the colonies and bring 
them back under the supremacy of Parliament, not suppress them militarily. The Tea Act, he 
thought, would only further isolate the North American subjects. Parliament ultimately voted to 
retain the Tea Act under Lord North’s adamant pleas. Yet, North’s logic regarding the 
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effectiveness of the Tea Act on increasing revenue for the East India Company did not hold. 
Instead, colonial agitation, much inspired by the Tea Act, only further strained British economic 
activity and the administrative schism widened as members debated coercion, appeasement, and 
force.  
Trouble in the Colonies 
While the mainland economy suffered and debates consumed Parliament and the Ministry, the 
North American colonists simultaneously contributed to crippling England’s financial strength. 
After 1764, Parliamentary legislation regarding the colonies interfered with colonial prosperity 
and growth.183 Realizing this gave rise to negative sentiment among the colonies about the 
mercantilist system of which they were a part as an extension of the British Empire. As early as 
1769, non-importation and non-exportation movements emerged. General Gage quickly alerted 
his superior of this movement. He wrote to Lord Hillsborough, “The Merchants at Boston have 
entered into a new subscription against importation, till some more Acts are repealed, as well as 
that which first gave Rise to the association for Non-Importation.” The General then provided his 
opinion that, “it is generally believed their Example will not be followed by other Provinces,” 
thereby diminishing the importance of the non-importation movement.184 The Commander’s 
trivialization of the economic rebellion emerging in the colonies falsely assuaged concerns of the 
English Decision Makers. It enabled them to delay formulating an effective strategy in North 
America as the colonies were not perceived as a viable threat to economic well-being. Yet, 
fueled by a combination of practical and ideological motivations, colonial resistance to British 
commercial efforts essentially halted the cycle of trade as England relied on the North American 
colonies as a main trading partner.  
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Contrary to the administration’s belief, non-importation and exportation swept the eastern 
seaboard from 1769 to 1770 and again in 1774. Every colony except for New Hampshire 
legislated some form of an agreement by the end of 1769. Threatened by the show of colonial 
solidarity, Lord Hillsborough and the administration, at large, ordered all ships currently in 
Halifax to move to Boston Harbor as quickly as possible. Hillsborough explained, “The object of 
this measure is to check further violences, prevent illicit trade, and to defend and support the 
Officers of the Revenue in the execution of their duty, and the Magistrates in the enforcement of 
the Law within the Harbour of Boston and Province of Massachusetts’ Bay…”185 He thought a 
show of force, not necessarily the execution of it, could deter future colonial resistance. This 
strategy temporarily worked as non-importation and non-exportation movements slowed. In their 
place, however, emerged more violent reactions to British economic policies.  
Beginning with the Gaspee incident in June 1772 and culminating with the Charleston 
Tea Party in December 1774, colonists actively destroyed British goods. This restricted the 
potential for profit from sales or taxes. In October 1773, cargo ships were burned at Annapolis. 
In December, the infamous Boston Tea Party occurred. Twelve days later, a similar event 
occurred in Philadelphia. Spearheaded by Boston and New York, boycotts and non-importation 
regained traction in 1774. Rhode Island and Virginia also actively agreed to boycott importing 
British goods or exporting to Britain. Finally, as the year ended, colonists in New York and 
Charleston committed their own tea parties.  
In addition to the physical destruction of British assets, North American colonies such as 
Philadelphia, Boston, New York, and Charleston, fell into debt to European creditors.186 Tobacco 
producers like Maryland and Virginia also incurred debt. These two colonies alone accounted for 
                                               
185 Hillsborough to the Lords of the Admiralty, 07 July 1770, CO 5/765. 
186 Davis, Rise of the Atlantic Economies, 282. 
WHEN PERSONALITIES DOMINATE, STABILITY FAILS: GREAT BRITAIN’S CHANGING NORTH AMERICAN 
MILITARY STRATEGY, 1768-1775 
 
84 
60% of the total colonial debt to Britain on the eve of the War for Independence.187 Colonial debt 
meant that the Crown did not receive the revenue from the colonies. Considering that England 
founded colonies for trade and profitability, indebted colonies defeated the entire purpose of 
financing these ventures. 
The aggregate of colonial dissent and indebtedness would have yielded detrimental 
effects on England’s economy. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, foreign 
trade, to include colonial trade, grew progressively more important for the English economy due 
to the geographic scope of Britain’s trading partners.188 By the eighteenth century, traders 
considered New England to profess ten times the trading goods as the other colonies and thus 
was an important set of colonies for England.189 Thus, anti-trade movements occurring around 
Britain’s primary trading partners, the North American colonies, on whom Britain relied to 
maintain the balance of trade in the Crown’s favor, would have detrimentally affect both the 
English economy and the mindsets of British Decision Makers.  
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Data on the value of goods exported to North American in 1768 and in 1769 highlights 
the drastic drop in exports, and by extension profits, over the course of just one year. In 1768, 
goods exported to North America were valued at £2,500,000 pounds. Only one year later, this 
value dropped to £1,635,000 pounds.190 This is a profit loss of 35% in a year before destructive 
boycotts even began. After the non-importation movement reemerged in 1774, Britain 
experienced a decrease of over 90% in the value of British imports by the colonies.191 These 
repercussions concerned the administration and only contributed to the divisions among the 
Decision Makers on how to handle North America. It seemed to many that the North American 
colonies were beginning to become too expensive to maintain and that something needed to be 
done. The question, however, was ‘What?’. 
The trouble caused by the colonies, especially in 1773, inspired more debates among the 
Ministry. While these debates included the price of duty to be placed on tea, a much larger 
question needed answering after the destructive actions taken by the Americans – should the 
Crown use coercive tactics to maintain his authority in North America? This time, Lord North 
and Lord Dartmouth stood on the same side, though conflicted in their own positions. Neither 
man wanted to resort to coercion. Yet, both worked to pass the Boston Port Bill which would 
shut down the Port of Boston to end colonial disorder and “secure the [economic] dependence of 
the colonies.”192 The logic, according to General Frederick Haldimand, the officer in charge 
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while General Thomas Gage was on leave reporting in London, was that, “The [Boston Port Act] 
should prove sufficient to restore the good order and harmony so essential to Great Britain and 
her Colonies, to assure the Dependence of the latter in the Kingdom of Britain, and in time 
remove the Prejudices now subsiding.”193 Economic pressure should work, the Decision Makers 
thought. Coercion, they assumed, would mitigate the necessity for military force. 
Thus, in a rare moment, March of 1774 experienced a brief unity of mind – whether 
willingly or begrudgingly – between the King, the Prime Minister, the Colonial Secretary, and 
the Commander in Chief. The administration felt optionless. Coercion appeared the only 
adequate course of action because, as Lord North declared when lobbying Parliament’s support 
for the Port Bill, one of the pieces of legislation included in the Coercive Acts, “If [the 
Americans] deny authority in one instance, it goes to all; we must control them or submit to 
them.”194 Faced with colonial opposition, Parliament still voted in favor of the Coercive Acts, to 
include the Boston Port Bill. Uncertainty loomed over what to do after the enactment of this 
legislation. Strategic cohesion disbanded once again as members of the Ministry began to retreat 
from their forceful approach to colonial governance while the King grew more resolute in his 
desire to escalate legislative force to military action in North America. Meanwhile, amid these 
philosophical debates of how to subjugate the colonies still lay the practical problem of financing 
the North American experiment.  
Over-expanded and Underfunded: The Costs of an Empire 
 
By the eighteenth century, British Decision Makers must have understood the mounting cost of 
maintaining unruly colonies in an empire which included holdings in Europe, Asia, the 
Americas, and Africa. From the systemic costs associated with colonial and commercial policy 
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to the logistical oversight of such a diverse empire, not to mention the burden of maintaining a 
substantial military presence in not only North America but also in all British colonies, a cost-
benefit analysis suggests that England may have been over-expanded on the Eve of War.  
The costs associated with trade increased as trade expanded outside of England and the 
European continent. As Ralph Davis explains, “Because of the distances over which goods were 
now carried and the new kinds of uncertainty involved in very long-distance trades, the amount 
of capital needed for carrying on trade grew much faster than the value of trade itself.”195 The 
increased cost of maintaining trade only added to the financial strain pulling on the English 
economy at the end of the 18th century. To sustain trade, the Crown increased the size of his fleet 
to meet the new demands of his overseas markets. Debts then increased as merchants – to 
include the East India Company – required larger credit lines to fund ventures and government 
interest in problems associated with colonial trade also grew.196 These changes would have 
required deliberate thought, attention, and time from British political Decision Makers; thus, yet 
another logistical puzzle was introduced in the pre-War period as running an empire, not just 
thirteen colonies on the eastern seaboard of North America, consumed the minds of the elites.  
North America territory acquisition and expansion also contributed to the costliness of 
the British Empire. The Treaty of Paris, which ended the Seven Years’ War in 1763, added 
Canada, Nova Scotia, Cape Brenton, the Floridas, Senegal, Grenada, Tobago, Dominica, and St. 
Vincent, as well as the right to navigate the Mississippi River, to the Crown’s domain. As 
discussed earlier, the Seven Years’ War hindered Britain’s economy. While these territories 
wielded potential trading benefits for mercantilists and traders, they also received military 
support, further draining Parliament’s purse. Financial reports from Quebec, St. Augustine, and 
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Florida generally – three colonies which, when aggregated – span the length of British North 
America, provide an overview of the average cost of these new acquisitions. At the beginning of 
the 1770s, two piles of barracks for one battalion cost £9190.14.6 (Quebec currency) in 
Quebec.197 In St. Augustine, one battalion cost £6680.16.6 (New York currency) to raise.198 
Finally, in Florida, two piles of barracks for lodging six companies, a fraction of the number of 
troops stationed in the Florida territory at the time, cost £13,642.8.0 (New York currency). 
Repairs on these buildings set the Crown back another £760.0.0 (New York Currency).199 These 
are just a few examples of the logistical costs of building a military presence throughout North 
America. They fail to address the personnel costs such as food and pay, the price for munitions, 
and any other unexpected expenses. They also do not highlight the debates over the strategic 
value of garrisons which also emerged among members of the ministry. 
Given his vantage point from North America, Commander in Chief Gage yielded 
opinions about the benefits and costs of establishing and maintaining certain military posts. One 
such post was the costly site at St. Augustine. The General provided his recommendation to Lord 
Hillsborough. He wrote, “I am of the opinion that St. Augustine is an inconvenient station, both 
on account of Danger…” – likely alluding to the Spanish and Native threats in the region – 
“…and Impediments of the Bar and that Transports must be provided in other Ports, which must 
occasion Delay in an Embarkation.”200 Gage perceived that St. Augustine provided neither 
strategic nor economic benefit for the crown and he attempted to communicate this to his 
counterparts 3000 miles away. These factors also needed to be considered when assessing the 
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myriad costs facing the British Empire. While the accounts from Quebec, St. Augustine, and 
Florida are by no means complete, their insight is still valuable when telling the story of the 
various pressures faced by the British political and military Decision Makers in the coming of 
the American War of Independence as they express, though partially, one of the many expenses 
of maintaining a global empire.    
Costs only increased from the time the British Regulars arrived in Boston in 1768. From 
the onset, Great Britain tried to govern Boston in two financially-draining ways. First, England 
desired to continue to colonize North America and use the vast territory as a source for raw 
material and trading repository for excess British goods. In the first year of the occupation, the 
crown paid over £500,000,000 in salaries alone of the officers tasked with managing Indian 
Affairs.201 French presence in the frontier also increased costs associated with managing a 
relationship with Native Americas. To prevent the illicit entry of smuggled French goods” “into 
the Kings Territory,” General Gage recommended erecting forts to prevent French trading and 
hunting anywhere east of the Mississippi.202 Recommendations such as this and other concerns 
about the Ohio Region and, more generally, the North American frontier, flood correspondences 
between the Commander in Chief and the Colonial Secretary. This intimates that both men were 
concerned about trade and profitability in North America – not just the budding insurrection 
occurring in the north east. Therefore, financial considerations distracted the Decision Makers as 
they considered the feasibility of supporting multiple operations. Supporting a colony with the 
dream of profitability is an expensive endeavor, in and of itself. When coupled with navigating 
preexisting boundaries and attempting to establish new boundaries, all while establishing 
security, these expenses dramatically increase.  
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Sending a substantial military force, funded by the British people, to Boston also added 
another layer of expenses to the already pricey operation.203 Expenses for maintaining a military 
presence in Boston display the true costliness of the over expanded British Empire. Try as he 
may, the Secretary of the Treasury pressured General Gage to bring military expenses under 
strict control and instructed that no new works began in North America unless approved by the 
Treasury.204 However, Gage and the rest of the British Decision Makers did not heed this 
warning long as evidenced by maintaining a military presence in Boston with the expensive 
mission of aiding the civil authority in maintaining the peace.  
Correspondences between the War Office, the Colonial Secretary, and the Commander in 
Chief offer enlightening information about the costs of managing and protecting the Boston 
colonists. These records document salaries for government officials and costs associated with 
housing troops in and around Boston.205 Even a cursory overview of the financial reports 
blatantly demonstrates that sending regulars to Boston was an extremely expensive decision – 
the logistical complexities and costliness of which only increased as the decade progressed and 
tensions escalated throughout the British Empire.  
Fifteen battalions occupied North America between the frontier and the east coast from 
early 1768 until 1775. These men required, at minimum: lodging, food, uniforms, salaries, 
weapons, and medical services; their equipment required constant repair. While most funding 
went to food, upwards of 5% of the total cost of maintaining the army in Boston went to repairs 
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of barracks, weapons, and other equipment.206 The nominal yearly cost of rations for these 
fifteen battalions came to £22,000 pounds and spoilage, transportation, and other contingencies 
cost £68,000. Another £40,000 went to supporting the artillery battalions and other ordinance 
services independent of the other fifteen battalions. Finally, another £6,000 went to any other not 
inventoried expenses. In total, the British army brought roughly £300,000 sterling into the North 
American colonies per year and cost, at minimum, £90,000 pounds a year for basic sustainment. 
After all expenses are totaled, the presence of forces in North America drained roughly £400,000 
pounds from the English Treasury each year.207  
Adding to the expenses were the salaries of the colonial governors and other civil 
authorities – in theory all supported by the duty placed on tea imported to America but, in reality, 
given the colonial opposition to paying this duty, was actually funded by Parliament’s dwindling 
purse. For example, to host the officials of just one court in the Massachusetts Bay, the Crown 
was responsible for £1400 a year.208 To pay the Governor of the Massachusetts Bay required 
another £1500 a year, an income that was, by law, untaxable.209 
Soldier housing proved to be another constant logistical and economic problem for the 
British army in Boston. From the day they arrived in fall of 1768, General Gage faced trouble 
when considering how and where to quarter all of his troops. He immediately disclosed to 
Secretary Hillsborough that “...the expense of providing quarters is likely to fall upon the 
Crown.”210 The financial burden of North American operations was, therefore, already seen not 
one month into the deployment. By 1769, Gage’s warning proved true when he relayed to the 
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Colonial Secretary that, “The General Assembly of the Massachusetts Bay had peremptorily 
refused to repay the sums expended on account of the Crown for quartering His Majesty’s 
Troops in that Province.”211 Only one year into the deployment, it became clear to the Decision 
Makers that this would be a costly endeavor. Economic considerations only magnified when 
considering the state of the troop quarters.  
Castle Island, just outside of the city of Boston, eventually became the primary quartering 
location. Yet, financial challenges arose even when using this preexisting fort. For most of the 
pre-War period, Soldiers lived in extremely poor conditions, housed in dilapidating garrisons, 
because no funding to repair the buildings.212 Many restorations needed to be completed to bring 
the makeshift barracks to livable standards. Three years into the Boston operations, repairs still 
occupied the minds of the Decision Makers. General Gage oft wrote to his commander, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, explaining conditions and requesting additional funding. 
Secretary Hillsborough, beginning to recognize the surmounting costs of the Crown’s current 
engagement, wrote back to colonial leadership: “With regard to the repairs of and additional 
works at the Castle...I can only say that as what has been already done will, I perceive, make a 
very heavy Article into the Military Contingent Expenses of North America. It is very much to 
be wished that any further Demand might at present be avoided…”213  
1771 witnessed a trend towards a desire to limit spending from Whitehall and London. 
The War Office wrote to General Gage commanding a troop reduction and pay deduction in 
North America to alleviated some of the financial burden placed on the mother country.214 This 
is important to note as this order, along with many others, suggests that the Crown was 
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concerned with the finances in the pre-War period. The economic strain likely played a larger 
role in the ultimate decision to go to war with the North American colonists than the usual 
narrative about the American Revolutionary War offers. As historian John Shy explains 
The impact of economic activity was considerable, if difficult to describe precisely. 
Between 1768 and 1774, the principle money contractors carried about 94,000 pounds 
Sterling into North America annually for the payment of various ‘extraordinary’ 
expenses. In an economy with a chronic imbalance of payments and shortages of hard 
money, and with total annual reports of 2,000,000 pounds, this injection of specie was of 
some importance.215  
 
The costs of trade, maintaining a global empire, conducting military operations throughout North 
America, and attempting to support a civil authority in Boston became too much for the already 
weak British authority. Decision Makers, feeling this economic pressure, would have factored in 
these financial considerations when deciding the best course of action in North America.  
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
After eight years of volatile markets and stretched finances, English debt amounted to 
£245,000,000 million pounds.216 The revenue accrued from taxes only comprised £12,000,000 – 
an amount too small to make a substantive difference amid the ever-increasing costs of the 
British Empire. A disconnect existed between British officials and the North American colonists. 
Decision Makers, concerned with domestic financial troubles, neglected to see, let alone 
understand, the colonial perspective. This was especially true when placing restrictive trade 
measures or duties on the subjects.217 Essentially, being blinded by events exogenous to Boston 
and influenced by their own positions and personalities contributed to why those in power could 
not form a sufficient military strategy. From the weaknesses of protective nature of 18th century 
English mercantilism, to the economic crises catalyzed by the collapse of the East India 
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Company and compounded by colonial uprisings, to the general costs of maintaining a global 
empire, the various financial burdens on the British economy proved too much. Though the 
military and political Decision Makers could not reach a strategic consensus, they could all agree 
on at least one fact – something needed to be done in North America to alleviate Great Britain of 
one financial stress. As historian Andrew O’Shaughnessy explains, “These royal colonies in 
America became, in a sense, pawns in the mercantilist game, living pawns, it is true, the welfare 
and producing power of which were to be carefully nurtured, but pawns nevertheless…” that 
gave Great Britain only two alternatives: “either to keep them in a state of dependence and to 
monopolize their trade; or else… ‘to desert them and give them up to some neighbour to 
England’s great loss and injury.’”218 It is this dilemma over whether to continue to devote time, 
energy, and resources into North America or give the colonies up – via military force or 
otherwise – which permeated most conversations deliberating how to handle North America. 
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“Invincibility lies in oneself. Vincibility lies in the enemy. Thus the skilled can make themselves 
invincible. They cannot cause the enemy’s vincibility.”219 
 
The Loyalist soldiers stood at the position of attention awaiting orders from their commanding 
officer. The same anxiety, excitement, and sense of duty that lingered in the air when the large 
schooner arrived in Boston Harbor in 1768 loomed over the multiple British garrisons 
throughout Boston in mid-April of 1775. Rigid in their ranks, the Red Coats reflected on what 
they experienced within their area of operations over the last seven years. Directed attacks 
interspersed times of peace. Stability devolved to escalating tensions and later unthinkable 
violence between the colonists and the Regulars. Many wondered how and why it took General 
Gage this long to call the men to prepare for war against the rebellious colonists. Little did they 
know that back in London, competing personalities, global threats, and economic troubles 
consumed the last seven years. For the men who served in Boston from the very beginning, they 
witnessed their overarching mission in North America shift from stability and civil support to 
forceful and offensive suppression at all levels. It seemed as though the Crown would no longer 
tolerate insurrection. The eve of War was finally upon them. 
Meanwhile, the military and political Decision Makers exchanged correspondence. From 
3000 miles away in Whitehall, Secretary Dartmouth wrote to General Gage’s chain of command. 
The events in Boston had become too much. The Colonial Secretary, asserting that the 
“Inhabitants of that Town” suffered from a “Madness,” proceeded to order the Commander in 
Chief to “make the necessary preparations, which as much Silence and Secrecy as possible, for 
marching upon the first Requisition, to Boston…”220  The order had been given. Troops were to 
be reallocated from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania to bolster His Majesty’s forces for 
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220 Dartmouth to Haldimand, 09 March 1775, CO 5/95. 
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an impending attack on his North American subjects. Over twenty battalions occupied the King’s 
North American holdings from Canada down to the Floridas at the beginning of 1775.221 These 
were originally posted to maintain the peace throughout this part of the British Empire; however, 
Crown made the decision – the King and his administration willingly accepted the risk of 
reorganizing the British Forces if it meant indefinitely crushing the insurrection spreading from 
the Massachusetts Bay.  
Controversial as it may have been, Secretary Dartmouth, optionless, concluded by giving 
the power to the military to “act as Occasion shall require” in March 1775.222 Then, on the 15 
April 1775, only four days before the fateful battles in Lexington and Concord, General Gage 
received another set of orders from the Secretary of State. In it, Dartmouth ordered the 
Commander of the Regulars to take measures that appear “most effectual for suppressing, by a 
vigorous exertion of your Force, that Rebellion, which, if not timely and effectually risisted must 
end in the total subversion of all Government.”223 Just as in 1768, supporting the execution of the 
laws weighed on the minds of the Decision Makers in Whitehall. This time, however, military 
force was an option. Upon receipt of the packet, General Gage and his officers followed orders 
and prepared the men to march on Concord. 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
 A spectrum of hawks and doves, some resolute and some wavering, comprised British 
leadership in the prelude to the American War of Independence. By 1775, King George appeared 
conflicted in his conclusion of the necessity of military force. Lord North remained susceptible 
to various political pressures yet tried to espouse a peaceful solution. The Earl of Dartmouth 
                                               
221 “Disposition of the Forces in North America, including the Regiments under Order for Boston,” February 1775, 
WO 4/93.  
222 Dartmouth to Haldimand, 09 March 1775, CO 5/95.  
223 Dartmouth to Gage, 15 April 1775, CO 5/765. 
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emerged confident that offensive action was not the appropriate course of action. Lastly, General 
Gage expressed continued uncertainty about what to do in his area of operations. The 
combination of the personalities of the political and military Decision Makers, European powers 
threatening the British Empire, and the economic hardships facing the English economy created 
the perfect storm to distract the Decision Makers from constructing a cohesive military strategy 
in North America from 1768 to 1775. Lack of strategy proved to be the fatal oversight which 
triggered the evolution of the initial military orders to “support and protect the Civil Magistrates, 
and the Officers of His Majesty’s Revenue” in their “preservation of the publick Peace, and the 
due Execution of the Laws” to ones advocating offensive actions in New England.  
Perhaps, had the Decision Makers effectively followed through with their deployment of 
military force to Boston in 1768, one of the rare moments in which the prelude to the American 
War of Independence witnessed strategic cohesion, and acted preemptively against the budding 
violence in the Massachusetts Bay, then the Crown may have avoided a costly war and 
maintained his North American holdings.224 However, by the time a cohesive strategy was 
temporarily agreed upon in 1774 with the adoption of the Coercive Acts, it was too late to 
change the course of action unfolding in Boston. The subjects had already resigned themselves to 
violence and were ready to do whatever it took to cast off the imperial chains of King George III. 
Though Great Britain ultimately lost the American War of Independence, thus enabling 
history to forever codify it as the American Revolution, insightful lessons about strategy and 
decision making and, more generally, the causes of conflict can be gleaned from the empire’s 
                                               
224 Machiavelli expands on this theory. He hypothesizes that “You must never allow disorder to develop in an 
attempt to avoid war, as this way you are not escaping war, but simply postponing it to your own disadvantage” 
(Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Peter Constantine (New York: Random House), 15-16). Great Britain allowed for 
disorder to develop and continue in the Massachusetts Bay instead of suppressing insurrection outright. This trepid 
inaction laid the groundwork for the escalation of force from both sides over the seven-year period in which British 
Regulars occupied Boston.  
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crushing defeat. An analysis of the pre-war period demonstrates that the Decision Makers failed 
to create a shared understanding amongst themselves when planning operations in North 
America. I assess that this failure was a result of being distracted by myriad events throughout 
the British Empire. While hypothesizing the reason for failure to create a strategy and 
appropriately plan is important, what is more important is noting the effects of this failure. The 
inability of the Decision Makers to communicate and establish a cohesive plan led to war – a war 
which ended with the loss of Great Britain’s North American holdings. The globe perceived the 
British Empire as invincible. However, the leadership from 1768 to 1775 exposed British 
vulnerability; thereby allowing their American subjects to make themselves invincible at the 
mercy of England.  
Constantly shifting individual and collective strategies for North America enabled a 
stability mission to aid the civil authorities in execution of the laws and uphold the public peace, 
motivated by the notion that the “Civil Magistrate alone who must stand responsible for the 
Peace of the Town of Boston,” to devolve into a desperate use of suppressive military force. 225 
Operation failures such as this need to be studied as stability operations did not end in 1775. 
Rather, militaries around the world continue to engage in operations with mission sets very 
similar to the orders given to General Thomas Gage by the Colonial Secretary in the summer of 
1768. If contemporary leaders are to look to history to mitigate the potential for mistakes, they 
need look no further than the actions of the British political and military Decision Makers in the 
Revolutionary Era to see the importance of cohesive strategy formation and decision making in 
conflict prevention. One major reason stability can fail, or so it seems based on the prelude to the 
American War of Independence, is due to the human dimension of warfare. People contain 
                                               
225 Hillsborough to Bernard, 30 July 1768, 5/765.  
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biases, distractions are inevitable, and personalities play a role. The human aspect of conflict can 
prevent the creation of a cohesive strategy and, therefore, unintentionally alter a course of action 
to a point where the only viable option seems armed violence.  
The human dimension of warfare indeed drove operations in America for the seven years 
before the American War of Independence that His Majesty’s Troops occupied the territory. 
Misaligned personal motivations and visions dominated the planning and decision making 
process. Historian John Shy proposes that:  
For those at the highest level of government, policy and honor were becoming hopelessly 
confused with one another. The honor of the army, virtually penned up inside Boston by 
fear of a rabble that had proved its cowardice and indiscipline during the last war, was at 
issue; thus, by extension, the honor of the king, of the nobility, and even of the “nation” 
were involved.226  
 
Compromise and communication therefore became impossible as the Decision Makers grew 
more resolute in their visions for New England strategy. Geopolitical threats and economic strain 
only exacerbated the growing tensions and Ministerial divides as people lobbied for resources. 
Clearly, the Decision Makers were not passively reacting to events unfolding in North America. 
Rather, correspondences and addresses highlight that Boston and the North American colonies, 
at large, were low on the priority list for British political and military leaders amid the exogenous 
threats to the Crown’s imperial authority. Within this analysis of competing demands 
obfuscating cohesive strategy among national leaders lies the other side of the story of the 
coming of the American War of Independence.  
  
                                               
226 Shy, “Weak Link of the Empire,” 26. 
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Appendix 1. Timeline of events throughout the British Empire from 1768-
1775. The timeline highlights notable events addressed in this thesis. Light 
blue circles represent domestic political events; red circles represent 
military orders; purple circles represent legislation; green circles represent 
economic events; gold circles represent geopolitical events; black circles 
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Shifts in Strategy by Decision Maker 
Appendix 2. Map of shifts in strategy by each Decision Makers from 1768-1775. This map portrays the 
diversity of opinions and lack of overall shared understanding and strategy regarding how to handle the 
North American colonies. Colors and triangles delineate each Decision Maker. Rectangles delineate a 
strategic choice. The oval represents the start to the American War of Independence with the march on 
Concord on 19 April 1775. 
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Appendix 3. Map of events throughout the British Empire from 1768-1775 and their corresponding 
magnitude of distraction on the Decision Makers. Larger, darker circles represent a greater impact on 
Decision Makers’ focus and strategic cohesion while smaller, lighter circles represent a lesser impact. 
Circles represent both security and economic threats. Great Britain maintained a military presence at each 
of these locations throughout the period preceding the American War of Independence. 
Empire Events and Relative Magnitude of Distraction 
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